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ABSTRACT
The motivation of this project is to revisit and reconsider the central 
concept of sovereignty  within  International  Relations. From  a  social, 
historical  and discourse-embedded standpoint, it will  be argued that the 
known conception and narrative of sovereignty as tied to the Westphalian 
nation  state, comprises only one definition  of several other autonomous 
uprising  and contesting loci  of sovereignty  in our contemporary 
transforming and globalised world. Thus, the concept of  sovereignty  as 
inherently  bound to a  demarcated territory and authority  of the nation 
state needs reconsideration  in  the aim of exploring more suitable ways to 
describe and conceptualise emerging  non-state agency  and polities in our 
current globalised world order. Deconstructing  sovereignty into the 
elements  of  territory, population, authority  and recognition provides a 
useful  framework for  understanding the significance of transnational 
non-state polities’ claim  to sovereignty. An  examination  the sovereignty 
claim of the Inuit Circumpolar  Council, functions as an  empirical 
example, possibly  indicating new ways in which  transnational  and 
non-state polities are altering known conceptions of sovereignty  within 
International  Relations. The Inuit Circumpolar Council’s  claim  to 
sovereignty  consequently  exhibit how the concept of sovereignty  is  best 
understood as transformative by nature rather than static or insignificant.
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CONTESTING SOVEREIGNTY IN THE ARCTIC
Characterising the Arctic  region  is a  difficult  task. However, defining the Arctic 
Region, the Arctic Human Development  Report  starts out by  stating, how  “There is 
nothing intuitively  obvious about the idea of treating  the Arctic  as a  distinct  region” 
(Young  & Einarsson, 2004: 17).  Many  reasons can be listed,  but most  interestingly  is 
the fact that  the political actors of the region, often thought  of exclusively  as the 
bordering nation-states,  have their  ‘political centers of gravity’ outside the 
geographical definition  of the  region  itself (Young & Einarsson, 2004: 17-18). 
Moreover, because of the fact  that the region  has been  largely  characterised by  its 
barren  nature and arid environment, not  much attention  has been given  to the 
complexity of its political structures.
The increase in  interacting  forces of climate change and globalisation are,  however, 
currently  attracting  more international  attention to the Arctic region.  As laid out in 
the Arctic Governance Project Report,
“The Arctic is experiencing a  profound transformation  driven  by  the 
forces of climate change and globalization ... resulting in  tighter economic 
and geopolitical  links between the region and the rest  of the world.” 
(2010: 2)
Speculations of whether  this increasing  link will result  in  international multilateral 
collaboration  and governance structures between  the Arctic states or  diplomatic 
gridlock  leading  “the Arctic to erupt  in  an  armed mad dash  for  its resources” 
(Borgerson, 2008),  have gained much public attention  and legitimacy, in the light of 
alleged vacuums of governance and absence of legally-binding treaties1  (Elleman, 
2012,  Borgeson,  2008). The Arctic can  thus be characterised as ‘a  region in the 
process of creation’,  wherein  normative and ideational  aspirations and conflicts 
might be equally defining as those based on resources (Rosamund, 2011: 3). 
Yet,  much  research  emphasise the collaboration  between  nation-states in Arctic 
governance arrangements and multilateral  initiatives; such as in  the Arctic  Council, 
the Nordic  Council  of Ministers,  the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Nordic 
Dimension  (Rosamund 2011,  Heininen,  2010; Shadian, 2006,  AGP, 2010; Niezen, 
2003; Fenge & Funston, 2009). More than  exhibiting  normative dissonance or  a 
fight  for resources leading to a  potential  ‘mad dash’,  these arrangements arguably 
represent  an already  established democratic and co-operational nature of the Arctic 
region  (Young,  2005; Huebert,  1998). One of the Arctic co-operation  arrangements, 
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1 Elleman argues that the absence of an Arctic Treaty - the need of which is often compared to the Antarctic Treaty - 
is indicative for lack of co-operative commitment (Elleman, 2012)
which  has gained most prominence is the Arctic Council.  This intergovernmental 
body  consists not  only  of the 8  Arctic  states2,  but  has obtained international 
recognition  and uniqueness,  by  granting  additional  Permanent Participant  Status to 
6  Arctic  indigenous peoples’ organisations (Fenge and Funston, 2009: 19).  The Arctic 
Council’s decision  of inclusion  may  be interpreted as a  move away  from  international 
state-centred relations towards a  more flux  view  on  ‘global social relations’,  in  which 
political agency are not confined to unitarian nation-states only.
We find that the increased attention on the Arctic region  have created a  need for 
understanding  local political processes as emphasised by  the Arctic Human 
Development Report:
“The Arctic is strongly affected by rapid social  as  well  as  natural  changes, 
and we need to know what adaptive mechanisms societies  and cultures in 
the North  have at hand, how they are likely  to react, and how these 
reactions will play out.” (Young & Einarsson, 2004: 15)
The Inuit  communities of the Arctic lie at  the periphery  of powerful modern states. 
The Inuit’s authority  is not  only  curbed by  these states,  but furthermore,  the Inuit  are 
highly  economically  dependent  on  these states.  Also multinational corporations and 
global market forces participate in  an  increasing  entanglement of the before rather 
isolated Inuit  societies (Heininen, 2010: 95).  Despite this,  the Arctic indigenous can 
also be perceived as having  attained a distinct and exceptional  status as ‘original 
rightholders’ of the Arctic region,  as they  have obtained significant  legitimacy  and 
outspoken rights within the forum of the Arctic Council (Bergman Rosamund, 2011).
As the Arctic  Human  Development  Report points out,  Indigenous peoples are, 
however, normally  investigated through community-focused anthropological  studies 
within  the nation-states of the Arctic  and important  gaps of knowledge are thus 
present  in  the understanding of the  transnational character  of the Arctic  indigenous 
peoples from  a perspective of political science (Young & Einarsson, 2004: 25). The 
northern  indigenous peoples’ culture and the way  in  which  this culture has been 
influenced by, and responded to,  increasing  processes of globalization, we argue, may 
contribute to a  better  understanding  of transnational indigenous movements in 
regional affairs and thus,  the conceptualisation  of new  political agency  in 
international relations.
Inuit Circumpolar  Council  (ICC),  represents around 160.000 Inuit  spread across the 
Arctic  regions of Alaska,  Canada, Greenland and Chukotka,  Russia.  They  constitute 
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2  Denmark, Norway, Canada, Russia, US, Iceland, Sweden, Finland are usually termed ‘the Arctic states’ as these 
are the countries with territorial possessions in the Arctic Circle.
one of the 6  indigenous organisations seated in the Arctic Council  and has since the 
1980s arguably  enforced the idea  of,  and given  voice to a  developing  Pan-Arctic 
identity and thus, one Arctic community (Shadian, 2006). 
Created in 1977  to ‘preserve the Arctic environment’ through  the formulation  of a 
comprehensive Arctic  policy, the initial discourse of the ICC was limited by 
conceptions of the Inuit  as stewards and pre-modern; distinct  from  citizens of 
modern  states. However, by  engaging in an  increasingly  interconnected and flux 
world,  already  undergoing contestation  and restructuring  through  processes of 
globalisation, the Inuit  have attempted to negotiate their  identity  and positioning  in 
international society.
PROBLEM AREA
“although  not a nation-state, as a  people, we do constitute a  nation” (ICC, 
2012)
Whereas the sovereign recognition  of a nation  is usually  pursued through  statehood, 
Inuit sovereignty  has not  been  pursued through  such  arrangement. Rather, 
sovereignty  or  self-determination  and autonomy,  has been pursued through  land 
claims agreements and international recognition  in  declarations giving right  to 
territory,  resources,  cultural autonomy  and notions of Inuit,  rather  than  domestic, 
citizenship.  The Inuit’s alternative approach  to obtain  sovereign recognition  was 
officially  formulated and pursued by  the ICC in  their  ‘Inuit  Declaration on Arctic 
Sovereignty’ from 2009. Herein, it was stated that, 
“Our rights as an  indigenous  people include the following  rights (...) all  of 
which are relevant to sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Arctic”
The Inuit of the ICC’s understanding  of what constitutes the right to sovereign 
recognition  and their  subsequent  claim  to sovereignty, which  transcends state 
boundaries,  notions of national citizenship and state sovereignty,  inevitably  contests 
prevailing conceptions of sovereignty as bound to the state.
“The development of  international  institutions in  the Arctic, such as 
multi-level  governance systems and indigenous peoples’ organizations, 
must transcend Arctic states’ agendas on sovereignty  and sovereign  rights 
and the traditional  monopoly claimed by  states in the area  of  foreign 
affairs. ... Inuit and Arctic states  must, therefore, work together closely 
and constructively to chart the future of the Arctic.” (ICC, 2009: 1)
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Whilst several  non-recognised communities and structures have claimed and 
obtained sovereignty  in  the past3,  the claim  of the ICC  stand as a  unique case in 
international political affairs, because of two important aspects: First,  the Arctic 
Inuits’ ambitions differ  from  usual discussions of indigenous peoples’ rights4, as the 
ICC does not constitute one indigenous community  within  a  single unitarian 
sovereign  nation-state as other cases,  but represents a trans-national picture of 
indigeneity  and identity.  Second, the fact that  the members of the ICC sustain 
membership of their  respective nation-states,  yet still  claim  a  collective Inuit 
sovereignty,  differs from  other transnational movements and entities5  seeking  or 
entailing sovereignty.
The members and representatives of the council  thus place emphasis on 
acknowledging  their  legitimate affiliation  to the respective nation  states in  which 
they  live,  and do not  as such  pose a  threat  to the conceptual  integrity  of the nation 
state. ICC’s claim  to sovereignty  does thus not  in itself challenge the state,  but  rather, 
it  challenges mainstream  theoretical frameworks of International  Relations, that 
have their  point of departure in  the ontologically  given  unitarian state.  An 
examination of this claim  might thus offer  an alternative narrative of contemporary 
international politics. 
“... issues of sovereignty and sovereign  rights must be examined and 
assessed in  the context of  our long history  of struggle to gain  recognition 
and respect as an  Arctic indigenous people having the right to exercise 
self-determination of/over our  lives, territories, cultures and languages.” 
(ICC D, 2009) 
Hence, an  investigation  of the ICC’s development  and possibilities of attaining the 
sovereignty  aspired for, might illuminate and contribute with  new  important  insights 
on  the development  of international political non-state actors’ conceptions of 
sovereignty,  as well as new  discussions on  the development  and inclusion  of 
transforming  or  rising political agency  within  the discipline of International 
Relations. 
Thus, the proceeding  analysis and discussion  of this project  will center  on  the ICC’s 
claim  to sovereignty.  We will rely  on  a  theoretical discussion  of the constraints posed 
by the assumptions of contemporary International Relations to the ICC.
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3 e.g. Canada, the independence movements’ assurance of sovereignty after the colonial break-up (Pakistan). For 
contemporary struggle; Palestine, Catalonia.
4 See American Indians, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, Adivasi in India, Canadian First Nations etc. (For a 
comprehensive account of this distinction, see Niezen, 2004: 
5 Such as supranational bodies, e.g. the International Criminal Court, The European Union etc.
The arguments produced and articulated in  this project will thus at once be specific, 
at  once general,  aiming  towards participating  in  the continuous importance of 
critically  reflecting  upon  and questioning  the international  governance systems in 
present  and coming world society. Left stands the specific question  of what role the 
ICC may  rise to take,  and the general  question  of how  to scientifically  and 
academically  conceptualise  transnational non-state actors,  which  may  produce, 
reflect  and define, ongoing  change and transformation  in international political 
affairs.
The above-stated considerations and arguments serve as the foundation  for this 
project, leading us to the following question:
How  can  an  investigation  of the concept of sovereignty,  through the Inuit 
Circumpolar  Council’s claim  to sovereignty, illuminate how  new  forms of governance 
and authority structures are renegotiated in international relations?
AIM AND METHOD
The aim  of this paper  is to investigate  the possible renegotiation  of sovereignty 
within  International Relations (IR).  We commence by  critically  examining  the 
prevalent  descriptive theories within  IR, namely  realism  and interdependence 
theory, in  order  to arrive at a  clear  understanding  of their  conceptions of sovereignty. 
This will enable us to deconstruct  the nature of sovereignty,  in  order  to delineate its 
constitutive elements.  Through  the adoption  of a  social  constructivist  epistemology, 
and using Essex School  terminology,  we examine how  these constitutive elements’ 
meaningful structure is rearticulated by  the ICC.  Adopting  a  discursive approach  to 
understand the possible  transformation  of the social  world,  we accept that  this world 
is shaped by  the concepts available to us and thus, that  any  alteration  of such 
concepts are to be found in articulated discourse rather  than concealed meanings. 
Hence, the problem  resides in  the language and the meaning  of it,  and we - as 
researchers - must  attempt to contrast  differing realms of experience, rather  than 
search  for  an  inaccessible truth.  The ICC thus function  as a case study, which  we use 
to illustrate the transformative nature of sovereignty.
This analysis is based on empirical data  analysed as text, meaning  that  we focus 
largely  on  qualitative analysis of moments in discourse. Official policy  papers and 
declarations from  the ICC, are together  with  meeting summaries, academic research 
and reports on  the Arctic used to analyse the ICC’s discursive rearticulation  of 
sovereignty.  Regarding  the intersubjective recognition  of the ICC’s rearticulation, we 
have analysed declarations,  statements and official  documents from  both  global, 
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regional  and state institutions. We use this material to analyse the intersubjective 
understandings of the different  discourses and thus evaluate on  ICC’s 
re-articulations.
The above-written accounts for  the modus operandi of the project. Whilst  several 
methodological  considerations will unfold throughout  the project, our  aim  entails not 
giving  primacy  to any  concept, such as sovereignty,  but rather  problematize how  it  is 
constructed and legitimised. A  comparison  of differing  ontologies and epistemes, 
through  an  account  of both  Western and Indigenous conceptions of sovereignty, can 
thus provide us with  new  perspectives on  international relations and alternative 
narratives of unfolding global politics.
SCOPE OF THE PAPER
This paper  is constructed around two main  parts.  In  the first  part,  we go through  a 
deconstructive narrative of sovereignty,  as it  is conceptualised and applied in  realism 
and interdependence theory,  and end with  a  social  constructivist account  of how  the 
concept’s constitutive elements can be examined.
In the second part we use the framework established by  the Essex  School of discourse 
analysis,  in  order  to analyse how  the ICC rearticulate sovereignty,  through 
antagonistic constructions of identity. The analysis is divided in  two distinct 
chapters.  First,  we analyse the rearticulations of the ICC, in  order  to determine how 
their  conception  of sovereignty  is structured. Second, we investigate how  this 
rearticulated conception of discourse  is recognised intersubjectively  in international, 
regional  and domestic discourse,  in  order  to examine how  the ‘overall’ social reality 
of sovereignty is renegotiated.
UNDERSTANDING SOVEREIGNTY
“There exists perhaps  no conception the meaning of  which is more 
controversial  than that of sovereignty. It  is an indisputable fact  that this 
conception, from  the moment when  it was introduced into political 
science until  the present day, has  never had a  meaning which  was 
universally agreed upon.” (Oppenheim, 2008: 129)
The discussion  of sovereignty  within International Relations (IR) is by  no means new 
or  groundbreaking. Scholars have consistently  occupied themselves with  defining 
and discussing the concept’s relation to both  the discipline of IR, as well  as to the 
relation of present  day  international  political  reality. Yet,  sovereignty  has,  since the 
demise of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War  and the increase in  impacts of 
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globalising processes,  attained further  conceptual  interest  and has been  put  under 
novel scrutiny. In  1995, the Commission  on Global Governance6  called for  “the 
principle of sovereignty  and the norms that  derive from  it  … [to be] further  adapted 
to recognize changing realities” (in Leonard, 2005: 417). 
In  the present  chapter we will argue that whilst these ‘changing  realities’ might result 
in  a  contestation  or  reconsidering  of the status of the ‘Westphalian  nation-state’, 
sovereignty  as an  organising  principle, analytical tool and essential element  of 
international  political reality,  has not lost  its importance.  Through  a short 
delineation of the understanding  of sovereignty  by  two main  descriptive theories of 
IR, namely  realism  and interdependence theory,  we will  argue that a  conceptual 
analysis of sovereignty  can  reveal important  insights on  the organisation  of 
international society.  Furthermore,  we wish to, through  a  constructivist-inspired 
account of the conceptualisation  of sovereignty,  argue that change in  the 
international society  does happen,  and that undertaking  studies of processes of 
contestation and transformation can reveal important insights into the field of IR.
In  the following section,  we will make an  outline of realism  and liberalism, and the 
subsequent  developments here off,  in  order  to determine the possibilities and limits 
of mainstream IR views on sovereignty. 
A REALIST PERSPECTIVE
Realist  theory  of IR stems from  the positivist  sciences and has been largely 
influenced by  reductionism  and presumption. Hence,  the aim  of realism  has been  to 
describe and theorise the system  of international relations in  terms and concepts that 
enable simple,  categorial  and causal explanations. At  the outset, realist scholars 
equates the state of nature in  the international system  to that of man; “solitary, poor, 
nasty,  brutish  and short”  (Hobbes, 1991: 89).  This approach  to the international 
system,  as an  essentially  upscaled version of domestic society,  assumes states as 
self-interested,  power-seeking, rational and unitarian actors in comparison  with 
independent  individuals.  The positivist  and reductionist origins of realism  have thus 
largely  resulted in  a conceptualisation  and assumption  of the state as “the organic 
subject  of sovereignty”  (Shinoda, 2000: 130).  As James Rosenau  asserts, “[the state 
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6  The Commission produced in 1995 the report “Our Global Neighbourhood” (in Rosamund, 2011: 17), wherein 
‘global governance’ was defined “Governance is the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and 
private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may 
be accommodated and co-operative action taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce 
compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in 
their interest” 
is a] symbol  ... so self-evident  as to obviate  any  need for  precise conceptualizing” 
(Rosenau in Ferguson & Mansbach, 2004: 16). 
Contemporary  neo-realist  scholar  Kenneth  Waltz remarks how, in  opposition  to 
domestic society  where conduct and behaviour  is regulated by  a central  government, 
the international system  is characterised by  an  inherent anarchic  structure, with  no 
central  constraining governing  authority.  Subsequent  of the lack  of regulating or 
constraining authorities, the actors are left to defend themselves against  real  or 
anticipated threats (Waltz, 1979: 102-109). Waltz,  like other  realists, thus provides an 
unitarian  view  of states in the international  system; a  system,  in  which  states possess 
authority by being closed-off entities with solid and clearly demarcated territories.
Early  realists like Hans Morgenthau  (1946) and E.H.  Carr  (1936), labelled 
sovereignty  as nothing more than  “a  doctrine”  and a  “convenient label”  of the state; 
eternally  reduced to and dependent on  the relations and existence of the sovereign 
state as the highest authority  (Biersteker  and Weber,  1996: 4-5).  In  general,  both 
realist and neo-realist theory  has been  characterised by  a  basic assumption  of a 
prevailing  anarchic structure, which has resulted in  the maintenance of sovereign 
states as ontologically  given  starting  points of analysis. Hereby,  it  is not given  that 
nation-states cannot  be modified in  terms of size,  scale or  power,  but  rather  it  is 
assumed that  authority  is inherent  in  sovereign  states and thus, that  the structure of 
the international system does not change in nature. 
The starting  point  of analysis within  realism  has thus been  founded in  a  nomothetic 
research  agenda,  searching  for  general  causal laws for  policy-makers.  Consequently 
sovereignty  has become an unquestioned paramount assumption, constituting  the 
organising  principle within the theory  (Shaw,  2002). The inability  to question  or 
examine sovereignty  within  realism,  becomes obvious within  Waltz’ structural 
neo-realism. For  Waltz’ conception  of an anarchical  society  to be comprehensible, 
the international  system  must be inhabited by  unitarian  actors.  Hereby  the concept 
of sovereignty, as an  absolute authority  over  decisions of internal  and external 
affairs,  becomes naturally  important and defining  for  the structure itself,  and is 
hence not to be found in other entities than the state. 
LIBERALISM - THE INTERDEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE
The system  of international anarchy  as described by  the realists, also forms the 
fundament  of liberalism. However,  the liberalist  branch  of IR departed largely  in 
opposition to the ‘current’ state  of affairs.  Advocated for  after  WW1  by,  amongst 
others,  Woodrow  Wilson, this normative stance is based on  a  belief of the 
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fundamental inability  of the sovereign  state alone to secure peace in  the anarchical 
structure of the international system. Increasing  influence of international 
organisations,  regimes and economic integration thus form  parts of a  linear 
departure from  anarchy; a  development  assumed to be based upon  mutual  and 
absolute gains rather  than  reciprocity  and relativity, as within  realism  (Ferguson & 
Mansbach, 2004: 7).  Although this approach  was often  deemed a  normative 
movement  more than  a  theory  within IR,  descriptive functional and neo-functional 
theories - often  labelled neo-liberal  - have been founded on some of the same basic 
assumptions as liberalism.
During  the 1970s, such  neo-liberal theories arose in  the wake of increasing  economic, 
cultural  and political  interconnectedness; all  questioning the increasing importance 
and influence of transnational phenomena  and networks,  such  as economy, drugs, 
environment  and human rights in  the international  system.  Whilst  realist  scholars 
would assume any  such  transnational non-state phenomena  or  relations as only 
existing because of the will and permission of the state - as these phenomena 
arguably  originated from  “under  the aegis of a  hegemonic state”  (Biersteker  and 
Weber, 1996: 7)  - other  parts of the IR community  now  claimed unintended 
spill-over effects of these phenomena7 and argued that  non-state phenomena and 
increasing  international integration  would in  fact be able to influence,  if not  erode, 
state sovereignty.  Following  this claim, influential  scholar Susan Strange (1999) 
insisted that the discipline of IR would, in  order not  to follow  the decline of the 
nation-state and turn  into a  “Westfailure”, have to follow  suit  of this changing  world, 
by changing the ontological foundation and perspective of the discipline.
Whereas traditional liberalism  would focus on the security  benefits of increased 
international interdependence and integration, the new  more descriptive theories 
came to paint  a  more nuanced picture of integrative processes. More specifically,  the 
question  of how  the possible sharing, loss of, or  erosion  of state sovereignty  should 
be conceptualised came to mark a  series of divides.  The divide having  gained the 
most attention  is roughly  characterised as that between  dependency  and 
interdependency  theorists.  Whilst  the former would often  accentuate and judge 
multinational corporations as eroding  state sovereignty  in  a  rather  threatening way, 
the latter  would tend to stress the existence of international organisations and 
regimes, and the often  deemed positive and integrative effect of these institutions on 
interstate relations.  Interdependence theorists,  such as Robert  Keohane and Joseph 
Nye (2001) have though,  offered a  more descriptive understanding  of the increasing 
Rearticulating Sovereignty in the Arctic
12 / 64
7  Either functional (interconnection of sectors, leading to integration and spill-over) or political (supranational 
governance models) spill-over
integration; they  argue that the new  sovereign-less spaces of interaction  would not 
necessarily result in increased peace, but also shape new forms of conflict. 
Despite the apparent differences among the two stances,  they  can  though,  be 
gathered around an overall  functionalist focus on political economic  relations and an 
agreement  on  the importance of incorporating and investigating  the impact  of other 
agency than the state in the international system (Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 6-8). 
THE REALIST-LIBERALIST DICHOTOMY
Whilst liberalism  and realism  have been  highly  influential  for most IR inquiry,  these 
descriptive theories have not conceptualised sovereignty, as much as they  have 
treated it as a  statically  given  and organic part of the international  structure and state 
interaction. As such,  the concept of sovereignty  has been  key  for  IR inquiry.  It  has 
provided the means for  which  to identify  and understand patterns of interaction  of 
meaningful actors in  the international  system. However,  none of the above-described 
IR perspectives seem  adequate when  attempting to move beyond a ‘state-centric’ 
perspective and understand the ICC’s claim  to sovereignty  as a  non-state  actor. These 
theories are thus not  suited to our  aim  of trying to understand a  possible 
transformation of sovereignty; none of the  theories would seem  interested in  offering 
a  historical  and constitutive version of the relationship between  the ICC, as an 
emerging,  contesting non-state actor, and the structure of the international system. 
Neither liberalism  nor  realism  offer  narratives presenting  the underlying processes 
initiating  change or  transformation  of the understanding of sovereignty  in 
international political reality. 
CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Complementary  to the realists’ and liberalists’ work with  sovereignty, IR scholars 
such  as Robert Jackson,  F.H.  Hinsley  and Alan James have attempted to 
conceptually  define and analyse the importance and meaning of sovereignty.  Thomas 
Biersteker  and Cynthia  Weber’s (1996: 8)  comparison  of these three authors provide 
useful insights into the conceptualisation  of sovereignty, and we will  followingly  use 
their framework as a starting point for our conceptualisation. 
The three Anglo-American authors’ understandings of sovereignty  largely  exemplify 
the decline of the “international anthropomorphism”  attributed to the state, and 
followingly,  a pursuit of constitutive elements of international society  (Shinoda, 
2000: 130).  In  this chapter we will use the three mentioned authors’ 
conceptualisations of sovereignty  in  order  to approach  an  understanding  of what 
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constitutes sovereignty. We will argue that their  understandings are highly 
influenced by  an  “episteme of modern knowledge”  (Shinoda, 2000: 134), in  which 
the existence of sovereignty becomes inseparably bound to that of the nation-state.
HINSLEY AND ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY
Hinsley  perceived sovereignty  as being  inextricably  bound to the state, and his 
definition  of sovereignty  became one of the most  accepted,  namely  “the idea  that 
there is a  final  and absolute authority  in  the political  community  … [and that]  no 
final and absolute authority  exists elsewhere” (Hinsley  in  Biersteker & Weber, 1996: 
8).  This understanding of ‘absolute  authority’ reiterates the realist perception  of the 
international system  as inhabited by  unitarian  actors.  Thus,  sovereignty  only  exists 
where there is no infringement or  overlapping authority; only  the highest of 
authorities can  be considered sovereign. Hinsley  however, argues that  this highest 
authority  is not  necessarily  authoritarian; rather  the community  is “the source of 
sovereignty  and the state [is]  the sole instrument which exercised it”  (Ibid.  9).  Hence, 
Hinsley  places much  emphasis on the internal  dimension  of sovereignty  as 
constitutive, and his thoughts of sovereignty  in  international fora  involves “no more 
than the assertion or the justification of the independence of the state” (Ibid.).
JAMES AND CONSTITUTIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
However,  this external dimension  of “justification” and reciprocity  is exactly  what 
defines sovereignty  in  James’ “Sovereign Statehood”  (1986: 40). Here,  “Sovereignty, 
meaning  the condition which  fits a  state for  international life,  is a  matter  of law  and 
not of stature. It  expresses a  legal and not  a  physical reality”. Whilst  James 
acknowledges “the permeability  of the state” 8,  as also described by  interdependence 
theoreticians, he maintains that  insofar no constitutional superior exists,  the 
constitutionally  independent state remains supreme and sovereign.  Sovereignty  is 
thus by  James, primarily  perceived as a  constitutionally  formulated and legal status, 
which  grants legitimacy  for  membership in  the international society.  James’ isolation 
of sovereignty  as a  constitutional independence of the state,  subsequently  shapes his 
argument of what  constitutes sovereignty; a  state based upon  a  permanent 
population within  and constituted by  a  defined territory,  a  unitary  government  with 
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8 “Alan James ... As long as there is no constitutional superior, the sovereign state is supreme ... No matter how 
much the state seems permeable, interdependent and restrained, it is sovereign as long as it is constitutionally 
separate” (Shinoda, 2000: 134)
the capacity  to enter  into relations with  other  sovereign  states; all elements which  are 
elaborated in the conditions of the Montevideo Convention9 (Shinoda, 2000: 134).
Through  their  definitions, Hinsley  and James exhibit  the internal-external 
dichotomy  of the sovereign  state in  the international system. While Hinsley  in his 
work  largely  focused on  sovereignty  through the omnipotence of a  political 
community  and thus,  the effectiveness of internal  authority  and rule, James 
concerned himself more with  sovereignty  through  the effectiveness of international 
law  and reciprocal legitimacy.  This dichotomy  inevitably  represents a  challenge to 
the realist-defined sovereignty  ideal, as “[the state] unlike a  free individual is 
Janus-faced” (Jackson, 1993: 29).
JACKSON AND NORMS OF SOVEREIGNTY
The recognition  that  the sovereign  state neither  possess the same rationality  nor 
responsibility  as an  individual,  as assumed in  the realist ideal of sovereignty, is 
elaborated on  in  Jackson’s “Quasi-States” 10  (1993: 29). When  contemplating on 
quasi-states in  the international system, Jackson differs between  ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ sovereignty 11; whereas all  states are inevitably  constituted by  both  types, 
some states are by  Jackson  largely  considered products of negative sovereignty; 
established by  international norms,  rather than  enablement and capabilities. 
Through  Jackson’s idea  of negative sovereignty,  it  could seem  that  he follows James’ 
notion of sovereignty  as a  form  of socially  accepted norm  of political independence, 
which  should be organising  of international society.  However,  Jackson  (1993), 
investigating  processes of decolonisation, differs from  James by  pointing out  that the 
search  for  international  approval  and recognition  by  some states,  clashes with  the 
idea  of ‘independence’: recognition  implies a  search  for  association  and participation 
in social relations; not ‘asocial’ independence. 
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9 In 1933, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States set out the definition of a state(hood) as a 
person in IR, which according to Article 1 should possess a permanent population, a defined territory and a unitary 
government. 
10 ‘Quasi-states’ are used to describe states whose sovereignty is more juridical than empirical.
11  Derived from Isaiah Berlin’s notions of positive and negative liberty; negative sovereignty being based on an 
absolute non-intervention and reciprocity; “freedom from outside interference: a formal-legal condition”,  and 
positive sovereignty being based on a relative enablement “it is a substantive (..) means which enable states (...) a 
political attribute (...) to declare, implement, and enforce public policy both domestically and internationally. (...) 
Consequently it is a stronger characteristic of some states...” (Jackson, 1993: 27-29).
DECONSTRUCTING SOVEREIGNTY
Despite the fact that  all three described authors’ conceptualisations have differed 
both  in  their  preciseness,  depth  and scope when defining  sovereignty, we find that 
their  conceptualisations can  contribute with  an understanding  of how  sovereignty  is 
perceived constitutive in  international society.  Followingly, the assumed 
constitutiveness of sovereignty  will  be taken  under  scrutiny,  which  will  lead us to a 
deconstruction of the concept  into the four  elements of population,  territory, 
authority and recognition
CONCEPTUALISING SOVEREIGNTY
Both  Hinsley, James and Jackson  characterise sovereignty  as the absolute, highest  or 
supreme claim  to authority.  Furthermore,  they  all  tie the highest  authority  and thus, 
sovereignty,  to the state and it’s ability  to govern  within  its territory.  Hence, it may  be 
asserted that  they, to different  degrees, assume an  ‘episteme of modern  knowledge’ 
(Shinoda, 2000).  Hinsley  represents a  focus on  nationalism: in his understanding of 
the political  community  as the true source of sovereignty,  he exemplifies the modern 
idea  of the nation  is an  organic, real  and omnipotent  identity. James on the other 
hand, represents a focus on Grotian  rationalism  and constitutionalism: he 
exemplifies an external focus on  sovereignty  - existing  through  the ‘formalising’ 
international rather  than  the omnipotent national. Finally,  through  a historical 
approach,  Jackson define these two approaches of nationalism  and 
constitutionalism, as to be seen  as outcomes of processes of international interaction. 
From  these processes of interaction,  the national positive  sovereignty  can  be asserted 
as representing  something  progressive - maybe dissatisfactory  - whereas the 
constitutional negative sovereignty  can  be seen as representing a  political 
conservativeness (Shinoda, 2000).  Jackson  thus encompasses both Hinsley  and 
James’ internal-external; national-constitutional  dimensions of sovereignty, but 
emphasises the importance of social  interaction  and hereby,  recognition, as 
particularly constitutive.
The three described understandings of sovereignty,  have all been  particularly 
influential to contemporary  conceptual understandings and definitions of 
sovereignty.  James’ conceptualisation of sovereignty  as a constitutional political 
independence of the state, can  be found institutionalised in  the United Nations (UN) 
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Charter’s Article 2(7)12,  which, by  providing  a  juridical fundament  of sovereignty, 
constitutes and legitimises sovereignty  in  effect  of the existence of the independent 
state. Hinsley’s conceptualisation of sovereignty  as an  ‘effective’ means and right to 
rule of the political community,  is also significant  to how  we characterise  sovereignty 
today: sovereignty  is largely  perceived as existing  not  only  ‘de jure’,  but also ‘de 
facto’13. De jure sovereignty  without a  de facto,  effective exercise of power  has little 
recognition  in  international society. Declarations on human rights have increasingly 
been  sought legitimised by  and through  the existence of the ‘good’ sovereign  state, 
whose rule is presented as the very  protector of rights14. This ‘relatively 
contractarian’ notion, as well as Jackson’s notion  of quasi-states, has arguably 
‘legitimised’ authorisations of intervention 15 and international initiatives such  as the 
Responsibility  to Protect and the International Criminal Court; all contributing  to 
ideas of effective statehood as constitutive of and possibly  initiating  to sovereign 
recognition. 
Thus, we find that  both  Hinsley, James and Jackson’s conceptualisations of 
sovereignty  describe,  though  in  differing  ways, how  we perceive sovereignty  in the 
prevailing  paradigm. Whilst  sovereign  recognition  and independence is juridically 
enshrined and tied to statehood through the UN,  it  is also dependent  on  the domestic 
popular  legitimacy  as well as the majority  of the international society’s acceptance 
and recognition  of what  defines the ‘good’ empirical  function  of statehood. Hence, 
sovereignty  today  exists largely  in  effect  of two dimensions, which  both  seem  tied to 
the existence of the nation-state; firstly,  one of an  internal dimension  recognised 
through  the effective, empirical  and final rule of an  authority  over and through  a 
political community; and secondly,  one of an  external  dimension  recognised through 
norms and constitutional rules of international society. 
Our  conceptualisation of sovereignty  has so far directed us towards understanding 
sovereignty  in  the present world order  as mainly  constituted by  internal  and external 
recognition  of the nation-state.  This has arguably  resulted in  the construction  within 
“which  territories,  peoples,  and authority  claims will  be accorded sovereign 
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12 “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter.”
13  “de jure” expresses the legal, rightful entitlement, whilst “de facto” expresses what is in fact; whether right or 
not.
14 I.e.; ”The obligation to respect and to ensure respect for humanitarian law is a two-sided obligation, for it calls 
on States both “to respect” and “to ensure respect”. Article 1, the Geneva Conventions, the Responsibility to Protect, 
UN Charter of HR
15 Within the UN e.g. Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo
recognition”  (Biersteker and Weber, 1993: 12). Thus,  the elements of sovereign 
recognition  exists largely  in  effect  of the elements characterising  the nation-state; 
namely those of territory, population and authority. 
CHALLENGES TO THE SOVEREIGN STATE
In  order  to question  the elements of sovereignty,  and in order  to ask how  the ICC 
might  challenge these, we must,  rather  than assume all  states as sovereign, ask  how 
political communities through  social  interaction  produce and negotiate meanings of 
what  constitutes sovereign  recognition.  The assumed constitutive elements of 
sovereignty; population, territory, authority  and recognition, which  within the 
classical theories of IR has been  forged into “one single unproblematic actor” of a 
sovereign  state power, thus need to be reconsidered (Biersteker and Weber  1996: 5). 
Despite the fact  that  James’ explored the ‘permeability’ of states, none of the above 
scholars have,  according  to Biersteker  and Weber  (1996: 10),  fully  taken  the 
contemporary  challenges of interactive dynamics of state and non-state actors into 
account. This has allegedly  resulted in  a  rather  static conceptualisation of sovereignty 
and a  denial of “the significance of potential challenges to the ideal”  (Biersteker and 
Weber, 1996: 10). If returning to Hinsley’s conceptualisation  of sovereignty  as the 
“final and absolute political authority  in  the political community”, the premise of 
sovereignty  inevitably  loses value if it  remains tied to the nation-state, which  - also in 
our  above differing  of ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure’ sovereignty  - as a polity  is losing  relative 
authority  (Keating, 2002: 2).  Neither  Hinsley, James nor  Jackson  focus their 
research  on  how  the nature of sovereignty  itself can  be transformed, renegotiated or 
how  it  is constructed in the first  place: Hinsley  never  answers how  sovereignty  has 
originated,  James never  questions the composition  of the international system 
responsible  of enforcing the laws of sovereignty,  and by  turning  sovereignty  into a 
time-bound, completed and already-produced event  in  his works as an English 
scholar, Jackson  arguably  fails to foresee new  or  transforming sovereignty  claims 
(Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 8-10). 
Above, we provided descriptions of sovereignty  through  what  one may  term  a  ‘state 
sovereignty  paradigm’; founded on  the idea of the sovereign  Westphalian 
nation-state,  as constitutive for  world order.  This was the case during the time in 
which  IR arose,  namely  that  of modernity  (Gill,  1997: 15). However, one could be 
tempted to ask, whether  this era  of modernity  is really  reproductive,  cyclic  or forever 
prevailing? All the above described IR approaches seem  to maintain a  substantialist 
take on  sovereignty; the sovereign  state becomes the billiard ball,  which  is to be set 
into motion  rather  than  constituted by  such  motion, as Patrick  Jackson  and Daniel 
Nexon (1999: 299) figuratively put it.
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THE TRANSFORMATIVE NATURE OF SOVEREIGNTY
Eric Leonard (2005) claims though, that one can,  by  undertaking  a 
constructivist-critical or  post-structuralist  analysis and historical  account  of 
sovereignty,  argue that the conceptualisation of sovereignty  has undergone change 
and is open  for  transformation. Following  this,  we can  avoid making  sovereignty  a 
term, but  instead recognise it as a  process and configuration.  Starting  with  French 
political philosopher  Jean  Bodin, who in  the 16th  century  defined sovereignty  as the 
“absolute and perpetual  power  of a  commonwealth  ...  not limited either  in  power,  or 
in  function, or  in length  of time”  (Bodin  in  Leonard, 2005: 411), and proceeding to 
Hinsley, defining  sovereignty  as the “final and absolute political authority  in the 
political community  … and no final and absolute authority  exists elsewhere”, 
Leonard shows that  a  change is apparent.  Both  Bodin  and Hinsley  defined 
sovereignty  as the ‘supreme’ or  ‘absolute’ authority. However, whilst  Hinsley  defined 
authority  as “the body  politic,  which  the community  and the state together 
composed”  (Hinsley  in  Leonard, 2005: 411); hereby  turning  the state into “the 
instrument  of the  nation”  and describing an  indivisible,  but  contractarian rather  than 
perpetual power,  Bodin never includes the consent of any  other than  the highest and 
absolute authority itself in his definition. 
For  Hinsley, sovereignty  cannot  exist without  a  demarcated political  community  with 
a  political authority  or  as we know  it:  the nation-state (Leonard,  2005: 412). 
However,  before the rise of the nation-state, Bodin  localised the existence of 
sovereignty  as an  organising  principle, despite living  in  a  pre-Westphalian  era, 
dominantly  defined by  absolutist  monarchical and religious rulers.  Thus, it  can be 
concluded that  the intersubjective understanding  of the conceptualisation of 
sovereignty  has been altered through  time.  Whilst ‘ruler-sovereignty’ for  example, 
was constitutive of the time of Bodin,  so was ‘state-sovereignty’ of the time of Hinsley 
(Ruggie,  1993; Leonard,  2005).  Above,  a  transformation  of the intersubjective 
understanding  of ‘absoluteness’ of authority  has been  described. Kurt Burch  (1998: 
74-76)  further  provides an example of transformation  of one of the elements 
considered constitutive to sovereignty  authority; namely  the  definition  of entitlement 
or  territory; developing  from  a pre-Westphalian  ‘property-right of rulers’ to a 
Westphalian ‘property rights of institutions’16.
It seems from  the short example provided above that whilst  sovereignty  can  be 
perceived as a  time-bound and constructed arrangement,  it  does not  necessarily  lose 
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16 Burch does further explain and elaborate on how early fragile modern sovereigns could only attain legitimacy of 
property by extending property rights to a rising merchant class otherwise challenging the central power of the 
rulers/institutions
relevance as time changes.  Instead,  the concept  can  be - and has been - reconstructed 
and transformed; reflecting  the intersubjective understanding of the current global 
political system. So,  the conceptualisation  of authority  and the element of territory 
have changed from  Bodin’s characterisation  of sovereignty  in  a ‘pre-Westphalian’ era 
to Hinsley’s definition of this after the Peace of Westphalia. 
A TANGIBLE DECONSTRUCTION OF SOVEREIGNTY
The concept  of sovereignty  can  consequently  remain an  epistemologically  defining 
feature of the international system; sovereignty  is not  necessarily  inherently  tied to 
the modern  episteme of knowledge, but  rather  it can  be transformed and 
renegotiated through  the intersubjective understandings and practices defining the 
elements considered constitutive of the configuration of sovereignty.  Much like Fred 
Halliday  (1987), we thus argue that  the state cannot  be understood solely  as a 
unitarian  actor, because that  the different elements constituting  sovereignty  are not 
static in  nature.  Thus,  in  order  to approach  a  reconceptualisation  of sovereignty,  it 
becomes clear  that  rather  than  understanding  this concept as a  fixed, substantial 
entity,  we must understand it  as a  process contingent  upon  historical and contextual 
circumstances. We must,  in  order  to understand sovereignty, aim  to understand the 
social relations determining  it; the claims to it and the possible  recognitions of these 
claims. In  order  to investigate claims to sovereignty  however,  one must first explore 
how  the elements of sovereignty  are articulated by  the political community  claiming 
sovereignty.
Halliday  (ibid.: 218-219) argues explicitly  that  the state in the traditional approaches 
has been  seen  indistinct  from  government, society  and nation.  Although  we use 
different terms and are not  concerned with  states per  se, but sovereignty,  our  basic 
argument for  investigating  the elements of sovereignty  resembles that of Halliday. 
We argue that  sovereignty  is constituted by  the interpretation  and composition  of 
population,  authority  and territory  within a  political community  with  rights and 
responsibilities, and self-determination  over  specified policy  areas - all  of which  are 
recognised both  externally  and internally. In  this sense we do not  disregard the 
contributions on  the importance of territorial  integrity,  national identity  or 
subjugating authority,  but rather  we argue that  they  are neither  necessarily  bound to 
the state nor  static by  nature. In  order to fully  comprehend sovereignty  and 
recognitions here on, we thus regard authority, population  and territory  as 
transformable elements given  the assumption  that meanings can be ascribed to them 
and that  sovereignty  “...  depends on the orders of discourse that  constitute its 
identity and significance” (Howarth, Norval & Stavrakakis, 2000: 3).
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The idea  that the structure of the international system  can  be renegotiated, 
challenged and changed,  and that  its criteria  of membership and recognition  may  be 
likewise transforming and evolving,  demands “an  innovatory  social  ontology  [with] 
transformative and emancipatory  dimension[s]”  (Gill,  1997: 14). Hence, we find that 
an  investigation  of the social construction  of sovereignty  through  the ICC, as a 
non-state actor  contesting  the so far sedimented presentation  of the elements 
constituting  sovereignty,  provides us with  an  empirical  example that  makes the 
question of a changing nature of sovereignty more tangible.
A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO SOVEREIGNTY
Following  the above chapter, our  aim  is not to construct a  theory  that explains causal 
relations between  states and other  sovereign actors. Rather,  our  aim  will,  in the 
proceeding chapters, be to investigate the ICC’s formation  and rearticulation  of 
sovereignty,  through  an  analysis of the ICC’s interpretation  of the derived four 
elements of sovereignty: authority,  territory,  population and recognition.  We will 
commence by  briefly  outlining  our  methodological  and ontological assumptions, 
which  follows constructivist theory  and especially,  the discourse theory  developed in 
the graduate programme Ideology  and Discourse Analysis at  the University  of Essex, 
founded by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.
Kurt Burch contends that 
“if we, as social  members, regard sovereign authority  as essential in  some 
sense, then we may choose to preserve or reconstruct it  or perhaps 
constitute functional equivalents” (in Leonard, 2010: 421-422). 
As the aim  of our  project  is to understand and explain how  the ICC re-articulates the 
concept  of sovereignty, we adopt a  constructivist  epistemology. Our  modus operandi 
will be to analyse the ICC’s rearticulation  of sovereignty,  using  the four  derived 
elements of sovereignty: population, territory,  authority  and recognition. The 
reasoning behind our  choice of this philosophy  of science epistemology  is hence not 
only  confined to produce and contribute with  new  knowledge about  sovereignty  in 
IR, but  furthermore to mark, highlight  and acknowledge the differing  IR theoretical 
frameworks’ own methodologically  bound limits in  this production of knowledge: 
thereby  enabling us to transcend these constraints and explore and conceptualise,  in 
this case, the ICC, as an  example of a  rising non-state actor.  Reconceptualising 
sovereignty  through  a constructivist  framework  allows us to view  and understand the 
ICC as more than merely  an  epiphenomenal explanation or  phenomenon  of 
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overarching  structures or  subjectivity,  as within  the ‘objective’ positivist  or 
hermeneutical social science (Delanty, 2005: 137). 
Both  Burch, Leonard and Weber & Biersteker  compel  us to think of sovereignty  as a 
socially  constructed concept,  which exists dependent  on its societal acceptance and 
relevance. The ways in  which  the meaning of sovereignty  is negotiated and the ways 
in  which  practices of agents construct, produce,  reproduce and deconstruct state 
sovereignty  through  interaction  between  actors in  international society, lead us to 
consider  the constitutive relationship between state and sovereignty. Nicholas Onuf 
(in Leonard,  2005: 91) argue that sovereignty  can  be understood as an  example  of a 
social arrangement  that is created by  rules,  but also creates rules.  In  this claim, 
structure and agency  are not perceived as absolute or  ‘static’ concepts, but  remain 
relational,  relative and co-constitutive through  ongoing processes of interaction and 
establishing practices. 
Following  this logic,  an alteration  of the current conception of sovereignty  must 
originate from  the practices and knowledge interplaying  in  the international  system, 
as these determine what  is relevant  and socially  accepted. Sovereignty  as a structure 
and socially  constructed norm  can consequently  also help expose, access and 
understand changes in  present-time governance systems. As Leonard (2005: 425) 
asserts, “if the intersubjective understanding of the social relations within  the world 
changes, then the order itself can be transformed”. 
SOVEREIGNTY AS A CHANGING SOCIAL REALITY
This order  of the world was by  Stephen  Gill (1997: 14-15) defined as “an analytical 
phrase that principally  seeks to represent the actual configuration  of social forces in  a 
given  era”; here approaching  a  social  ontology,  containing more transformative and 
emancipatory  dimensions than  those within  traditional IR paradigms. With  this 
ontology  it  becomes possible to theorise transformation  and change of the elements 
of sovereignty  as products of “tensions, contradictions and limits”  in  processes of 
interplay  between  social  forces of agency  and structure. As Robert  Cox  (1992: 138) 
states,  “where there appears to be a  disjuncture between  problems and hitherto 
accepted mental constructs, we may  detect  the opening  of a crisis of structural 
transformation”. Drawing on  Thomas Kuhn’s notion  of ‘knowledge revolutions’, such 
a  conflicting  change of practices might  result  in  the occurrence of a  new  paradigm.  So 
far,  one might  say  that we have treated sovereignty  within  a  ‘state sovereignty’ 
paradigm.  This paradigm  was largely  based on  modernity, defined by  territorial 
boundaries,  positivism, rationalism, accumulation of capital and nationalism. 
However,  if we are entering a  new  era  of globalisation involving  phenomena of global 
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governance and decentralisation,  pluralism  and subjectivism,  one could argue, in  line 
with  scholars such as Shaw  (2002), Leonard (2005), Keating  (2002)  and Adamson & 
Demetriou  (2007), that these phenomena are increasingly  producing new  ideas of 
sovereignty in the context of a post-Westphalian or globalising paradigm.
Friedrich  Kratochwil also argues that  “Truth is a  function  of consensus in  a scientific 
community  sharing  criteria  of what  represents ‘good science’.  Results are considered 
‘true’ as they  emerge from  particular  procedures and practices”  (Kratochwil, 2011: 
167).  However, Kratochwil abandons Kuhn  by, much  like Alexander Wendt,  pointing 
out that  truth  is not  a  matter  of a  single logic,  paradigm  or  episteme of modernity. 
Rather, he argues that  epistemes and logics changes continuously  according to 
different actors.  Thus, instead of criticising  modernity, we should arguably  seek  to 
understand social  norms: whilst  prevailing  intersubjective understandings and 
shared meanings can  push  forth  certain  norms as dominant,  the constructivist 
recognition  of the world as constructed by  us,  should not  result  in  any  primacy  or 
ontological  primacy  to certain  logics or  structures of authority. Rather,  one should 
within  constructivism, seek to define sovereignty, knowing  that “our  concepts are not 
forced upon  us by  the world,  but represent what we bring  to the world in  order to 
understand it” (Skinner, 2002: 34). 
Adopting this line of thought, we will  proceed from  ontological assumptions of 
sovereignty  to ontological possibilities of change: actors,  as parts of the international 
structure, are  made up of relations between  power  and knowledge, out-acting  power 
through  the abilities made possible in  the structure, while at  the same time being  the 
co-authors of these abilities incorporated in  the structure. We seek to avoid the 
dichotomy  between  structure and agent by  instead searching  for  processes and social 
norms constituting  these relationships.  In  this sense,  agents and structures undergo 
constant  change through  political practices, which  we can  use “to chart  and explain 
such  historical  and social  change by  recourse to political factors and logics.” 
(Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000: 6). 
LOGICS OF DISCOURSE
Established ‘social  truths’ or  intersubjective understandings are constituted and 
visible through  communication  and discourse,  as it  is arguably  in  the discourse that 
the construction  is determined by  interaction  and reflexivity.  Thus we will meet 
Skinner’s acknowledgement17 by  acknowledging  the fact  that  “instead of applying  a 
pre-existing  theory  on  to a  set  of empirical  objects, discourse theory  [can] seek  to 
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17  “our concepts are not forced upon us by the world, but represent what we bring to the world in order to 
understand it” (Skinner, 2002: 34)
articulate their  concepts in  each  particular  enactment  of concrete research” 
(Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis,  2000:5).  Below  we will apply  the Essex  School 
theoretical  framework and enter  an  epistemology  where “partial and temporary 
fixation” of norms,  identities or  nodal points,  through articulation 18,  is what 
constitute this possible “social objectivity”.  As such,  all meaning becomes contingent 
upon  context  and all  discourse is derived from  differing historical rule-sets. This 
contextual  and historical approach  allows agents,  objects and actions to always be 
meaningful by  the orders of discourse; constituting  their  identity  and significance 
through  power  construction  and reification  (Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000: 
3, 22). 
THE ESSEX SCHOOL AND SOVEREIGNTY
Laclau  and Mouffe’s discourse analysis is a  valuable tool in  understanding 
formations of identities,  social meaning  and significance. For them  “...  discourses 
refer  to systems of meaningful practices that  form  the identities of subjects and 
objects”  (Howarth,  Norval & Stavrakakis, 2000: 4). As such, Essex  discourse theory 
is relying  on Foucauldian  conceptions; re-politicizing  concepts and discourses. 
Discourses are intrinsically  political as their  formation is always constituted by  a 
relation of knowledge and power, which  constructs antagonisms, drawing  borders 
between  ‘us’  and ‘them’. Howarth  & Torfing (2005: 11) explain  these antagonisms 
through  the Derridean  understanding  of socially  constructed binary  hierarchies,  that 
are reliant  on the existence of an  ‘Other’: In  mainstream  Western  thought  for 
example,  identities and nationalisms are understood as an  exclusive and superior 
‘inside’, whilst  the  ‘outside’ is considered inferior  and “accidental”  (Ibid.).  An 
example could be the idea  of the modern  individual,  existing in his or  her  own 
capacity,  independently  of other  individuals.  What Jacques Derrida  shows is that  this 
is actually  not the case, and that  the other  does not  only  constitute a  threat to the 
inside, but  rather  that this other  is constitutive of the inside and thus; that  the inside 
is in fact reliant on the other to which it can oppose itself19. 
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18  Articulation is “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a 
result of the articatory practice” and discourse is “the structured totality resulting from this articulatory practice” 
(Laclau & Mouffe in Howarth, Norval & Stavrakakis, 2000: 7)
19 In her book “Indigeneity and Political Theory” (2008), Karena Shaw investigates how modern political theory is 
founded on the antagonism between the Western Eurocentric nation-state and the symbolic other, in her example; 
Indigenous peoples. She finds that in modern political theory, where Indigenous Peoples often constitute the other, 
a reproduction of discourse contributes to the marginalised situation, wherein these peoples are prevented from 
reaching influence (Shaw, 2008). In other words Indigenous peoples constitute the inside of modern political 
theory by functioning as the antagonistic other.
What  this deconstruction  of the binary  hierarchies, so often  found in  societies shows, 
is the naturally  unstable relation  between  antagonisms.  Because this relation is 
reversible,  in  that  the outside becomes constitutive of the inside, and thus to an 
extent becomes more important,  we find ourselves in  a  situation  of a constant 
“undecidable oscillation”  between  antagonistic poles that  require some meanings 
and options to be constructed as more privileged over others (Howarth & Torfing 
2005: 12). It  is arguably  in this sense that  we should perceive state-bound 
sovereignty  - not as an  objectively  given  reality,  but rather as the present hegemonial 
social objectivity.  This notion  of hegemony  follows Laclau  and Mouffe’s 
neo-Gramscian  critique of classical  marxist theory.  Hegemony  is here not,  as in 
classical marxism, confined in  the modes of production  and the material differences, 
but instead hegemony  is understood relational: it  is understood in  relation to society, 
which  is conceived of as a  symbolic  order,  in  which  social antagonisms constitute 
political concepts and logics of exactly  hegemony, antagonisms and dislocation 
(Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000: 5-7). 
ANALYTICAL TOOLS AND CONCEPTS
Hegemony,  within  the Essex school framework,  can  be understood as a  concept 
describing  the stabilisation of any  specific  social objectivity  and hereby  order, within 
society. As analytical  tools for  investigating the construction  of social  objectivities, 
temporary  fixation  of hegemonising  projects and identities, Laclau  and Mouffe 
construct  the terms signifier, nodal points,  elements, dislocation, articulation  and 
logics of equivalence and difference. Identities are constructed through the 
articulation of certain signifying elements, or through:
“any practice establishing a  relation  among elements such that their 
identity is modified as  a  result of the articulatory  practice”  (Laclau  and 
Mouffe in Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000: 7).
These elements are bound together  under  nodal  points,  which  act  as signifiers or 
reference points for  a  system  of meaning or  “chain  of signification”.  These nodal 
points are what  makes the “partial fixation”  possible within discourse,  and are used 
in  order  to create discursive constructions through  meanings of its inherent elements 
and their  relations to each  other. In  political  discourse, nodal  points are constructed 
around ‘empty  signifiers’,  a  signifier  whose meaning  is not given  in  itself,  but through 
its inherent discursive structure of meaningful elements.
Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis (2000) uses ‘order  in  disorder’ as an  example; 
order  is only  present  as that which  is absent.  For this empty  signifier  to obtain 
meaning, a  specific understanding  and structuring  of discursive elements is 
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embedded under  the signifier,  which  then  occupies the structural position  of the 
nodal point in  the discourse. In  our case, in  order  to understand the rearticulation  of 
sovereignty,  we must investigate  the discursive structure, and the possible change, 
transformation,  modification or  displacement of discursive elements,  which together 
create a new understanding of the nodal point.
Logics of equivalence explain  the discursive construction  of a collective identity, 
opposed by  an  antagonistic ‘other’. This is done by  weakening  internal differences in 
order  to collectivise their  group around an  encompassing  nodal  point20 (Howarth, 
Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000).  Logics of difference,  as opposed to logics of 
equivalence, is concerned with  the dispersion  of different  subjectivities within  the 
social system. Whereas the logics of equivalence collectivise and strengthen  the bond 
between  (in  other  relations different) actors in  opposition to an  antagonistic  other, 
logics of difference refer  to the differentiating  processes where identity  is constructed 
through  a  weakening of the equating  bonds between subjects and a  strengthening of 
their individual differences.
The theoretical  framework of the Essex  School and its ontological  foundations 
provide us with  a  theoretical framework,  which  applied in  analysis must  be 
sufficiently  open  and inductive in  order  to avoid “subsumptions”  of empiricism  and 
theoreticism  (Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis 2000: 5). So how  is our use of the 
four  elements of sovereignty  not  reductionist? First,  our  aim  is not to apply  James, 
Jackson  nor  Hinsleys theoretical conceptions on to the ICC, and investigate how 
their  aim  and goal of obtaining sovereignty  can  be obtained within  these frameworks. 
Our  aim  is to understand how  the ICC rearticulate an understanding  of sovereignty, 
and how  this rearticulation differs from  the above mentioned authors and the 
prevalent paradigm in general. 
Consequently, and as will be discussed below,  we use the Essex  School conceptions of 
identity  construction within  discourse, and as such  we are interested in  how  the 
inherent  elements of a  discourse are  modified and displaced within  the discursive 
structure in  order  for it  to change meaning. Thus,  we use the four  elements of 
population,  territory, authority  and recognition  in order  to comprise a  clear 
methodological  approach, through which  the use and collection of raw  empirical data 
and material is enabled.  Also they  are used in  order  to simplify  the method of 
analysis and discussion  of the re-articulation  and displacement of the inherent 
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20  ‘Nodal point’ refers to a signifier under which discursive elements are gathered. Howarth, Norval and 
Stavrakakis explain how communism in the interwar period constituted a nodal point; an otherwise empty signifier 
was given meaning through its inherent elements, such as democracy, political rights, material equality. These 
elements, or moments, which give meaning to the nodal point, the centre of identity, and can change through time, 
so as the nodal point itself may change discursive meaning (Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis 2000).
elements of the discourse. As such,  the four  elements provide us with  a  rough  guide 
for  the analysis, and at the same time assist  in  facilitating our  discussion  of the 
antagonistic relationship between  the ICC’s conception  of sovereignty  and the 
present paradigm.
ANALYSING SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH ITS CONSTITUTIVE 
ELEMENTS
“Our rights as an  indigenous people include the following  rights 
recognized in the United Nations Declaration  on  the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP), all of which are relevant to sovereignty  and sovereign 
rights in the Arctic …”  (ICC, 2009)
In the ICC’s declaration  “A Circumpolar  Inuit  Declaration  on  Sovereignty  in  the 
Arctic”  the reasons and arguments for  a  version  of sovereignty  that will allow  them  to 
“...exercise self-determination over [their] lives,  territories,  cultures and languages” 
(ICC,  2009) are lined out.  In this chapter  we will outline the ICC’s articulation  of 
sovereignty,  using  ICC’s Declaration  on  Arctic  Sovereignty  as a  starting point,  as well 
as drawing  on other  declarations,  proceeding, policy  papers and so forth. Using  the 
Essex  School, this empirical raw  material  will  be analysed as texts; constitutive of 
discourse in  the Derridean  sense that all  meaning can  be found in discourse.  An 
examination of the logics of equivalence and the logics of difference will enable us to 
identify  the nodal point(s) around which  the Inuit  identity  is constructed, as well  as 
what constitutes the antagonistic ‘other’.
The practice of withholding  or  obtaining  sovereignty  and sovereign  recognition is 
part of the construction  of territories, population  and authority  claims.  To 
understand the conceptualisations and claims to these three elements,  it  is vital  to 
engage in  an  examination of the relationship between change and these elements of 
sovereignty.  So far,  we have laid out conceptions of claims to territory, authority  and 
national identity, which  have been  highly  influenced by  modern Western  ideals of 
sovereignty.  It  can  be suggested that as the prescriptions for  sovereign recognition 
change, so does the meaning of sovereignty.  The Inuit  arguably  encompass another 
episteme than  that  of Western  thought. Subsequently, an  outline of the Inuit 
conception  of the three elements considered constitutive to sovereignty, is necessary 
before examining  the possible legitimacy  and following  recognition  of these claims. 
This will also provide knowledge on  how  the ICC interprets the concept  of 
indigeneity, which  at  best  can be considered ambiguous in nature (Niezen,  2003: 18; 
Anaya, 2004: 3).
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Below  an Inuit conception will  thus be outlined and compared to dominant 
conceptions of what constitutes the prescriptions for sovereign recognition.
TERRITORY
Territory  is,  as we have derived from  our  examination  of mainstream  IR theory,  often 
found to be a  distinct  characteristic  of the nation-state.  Sovereignty  was thus above 
defined as an  absolute authority  over  some kind of territory, so as the authority  was 
constituted by  and constitutive of territory  - and as such, territory  was demarcated 
through  the articulation and enactment  of authority.  In  Eudaily  and Smith’s (2008) 
perception  of this ‘traditional’ sovereignty,  territory  also relies on  a  Hinslean  effective 
ruling  governance structure. Consequently,  we are left  with  what  Eudaily  and Smith 
terms “a  ‘sovereignty  paradox’,  where we must have a  sovereign state with  territory 
as a  necessary  condition  for  its ability  to articulate power; however,  this territorial 
imperative must first be satisfied by  some sovereign  legitimate authority”  (Eudaily 
and Smith,  2008: 314). Territorial integrity  is constitutive for  the relationship to 
other states, and has been  central when  analysing  international relations.  As Naeem 
Inayatullah  and David L. Blaney  (2004: 6) explain  through  their  description of the 
Westphalian  system,  states have, by  promoting  their  own sovereignty, constituted 
themselves as isolated entities, whilst  simultaneously  constituting  ‘others’ as 
equivalent  sovereign  others. Consequently,  sovereignty  is turned contingent  on the 
social relationships and arrangements of actors. The ICC  follows this line of thought 
in  their  declaration  on  sovereignty  as they  state: “Sovereignty  is a  contested concept 
[…] and does not  have a  fixed meaning”.  We assume the ICC’s articulation  of “land, 
sea  and ice known as the Arctic”  (ICC, 2009: 1); what  they  present  as the 
geographical context  of their  being, as interchangeable with  the already  presented 
concept  of territory.  Methodologically,  we are thus not  interested in  examining land, 
sea  and ice as objects in  themselves,  but  rather  we are interested in examining  how 
and what meaning they  are given  through  their  structural  relation  under  the 
discourse. 
For  the ICC, territory  is important  and has increasingly  become a  political issue.  As 
impacts of global  environmental  problems manifest  themselves on  the Arctic 
environment  and communities across nations,  responses to this issue is often 
perceived as needing to be addressed transnationally:
“The pursuit of global  environmental  security requires a  coordinated 
global  approach to the challenges of climate change … and a  far-reaching 
program of adaptation to climate change in  Arctic regions and 
communities.” (ICC, 2009: 2)
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“[Josef  Motzfeldt21] further  recognized that climate change has no border 
stating “research shows the need for  major studies across national 
borders if we are to understand the climate system” and find ways to 
collaboratively address those challenges” (ICC, 2010: 16)
In  the first  paragraph  of “A  Circumpolar  Inuit  Declaration  on  Sovereignty  in  the 
Arctic”, the ICC state: “The Arctic  is our  home”, further  arguing  that  the “Inuit  have 
been  living  in  the Arctic from  time immemorial”  (ICC,  2009). This conception  of 
their  bond to the territory,  in  which  they  live and originate from, differs from  the 
traditional conception  described above,  in  at least one important  sense. For  the ICC, 
territory  as articulated through  the land, sea  and ice, which  they  inhabit  and live off, 
is not  clearly  demarcated in the same sense. They  do not  seek  absolute authority 
defined by  a  certain  area,  but rather  they  seek the right  to natural resources and the 
right  to use territory  as defining for  their  livelihood and traditions. This articulation 
contrasts sharply  with  the previously  examined conceptualisations: the claims of the 
ICC rearticulate territorial integrity  from  being  a  geographically  demarcated and 
visible expression  of authority, and manifests instead the importance of being able to 
exert  self-determination  and rights over  usages of for example, natural  resources,  in 
order to uphold their way of life and culture:
“Our use and occupation  of arctic lands and waters  pre-dates recorded 
history. Our unique knowledge, experience of the Arctic, and language are 
the foundation of our way of life and culture” (ICC, 2009: 1)
Following  these conceptions of their  traditions of territory; nature and resources, we 
can  perceive of a  chain  of equivalence between  the Inuit  societies across the Arctic. 
We discern  a  commonality  produced through the traditions, language and knowledge 
developed across communities in  a  certain environment. Furthermore,  what  we see 
through  the declaration  is the bond articulated between  the Inuit  and the natural 
environment  of the Arctic.  It  is mentioned how  “unique Inuit knowledge of Arctic 
ecosystems … provide practical  advantages to conducting  international relations in 
the Arctic in  partnership with  the Inuit.”  (Ibid.: 2) Once again we see a  clear 
articulation  of an  equating  bond: the “unique knowledge”  between Inuit 
communities, through which they distinct themselves from the ‘other’.
Following  this distinction  between the traditional conception of clearly  demarcated 
borders and the ICC’s insisting focus on  the historically  bound connection  between 
nature and culture, we still  observe clear  connections between  the Inuit  cultural 
traditions and the territorial conditions of its survival. As stated, their  culture 
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21 Josef Motzfeldt is a member of the Greenlandic Parliament, for the party of Inuit Ataqatigiit; and ICC Greenland 
delegate at the present conference.
“depend on the marine and terrestrial plants and animals supported by  the coastal 
zones of the Arctic Ocean, the tundra  and the sea  ice.”  (Ibid.: 1).  This statement, 
combined with  the articulation  of a  claim  to participate actively  in  international  and 
national efforts to combat  climate change,  is significant  in  showing  the territorial 
aspects of ICC’s sovereignty  claim. Rather than  claiming  the highest and absolute 
authority  through  their  defined territory  in  a  Hinslean  sense, they  focus on  the 
possibilities of sustaining  and protecting  their  culture, traditions and way  of life, 
which  are seen  inextricably  linked to the use and sustainability  of the territory  and 
nature they  inhabit.  Consequently,  their  notion  of territory  is one closely  connected 
to their  cultural identity  and self-determination. In this sense, the territory 
articulated by  the ICC still  comprises a  defining  characteristic  for  their  political 
space, but is articulated through a  cultural equivalence between the Inuit 
communities bound together by their common reliance on and use of nature.
Hence, the  ICC’s conception  of territory, interpreted as an  element  of sovereignty, 
differs somewhat from  other understandings of how  territory  is perceived 
constitutive; in  earlier  described understandings, territory  was seen as constitutive 
not only  of the inside,  but  also reproductive of other  actors alike. The Inuit 
conception  of territory  ‘lacks’ the absolute  authority  that  creates a unitarian  entity 
with  a  reproductive logic.  The previously  described anarchical system; shaping, 
socializing and restricting the behaviour of states in  an endless reproductive logic, 
wherein  the state  upholds the system  by  fighting  for  its own  existence (Biersteker 
and Weber, 1996: 6),  is thus contested by  the ICC’s conception of territory  as it 
becomes a  far  more complex and intertwined web  of overlapping, contesting 
territorial communities and governance arrangements. Rather  than being  based 
upon  territorial integrity  and actual boundaries of a space,  the Inuit  understanding  of 
territory  as constitutional to sovereignty  is thus highly  based upon a  symbolism  and 
the right  to use resources,  land and nature in order  to maintain  traditional  ways of 
living, cultural integrity and self-determination.
Concludingly, the Inuit  bond with  territory  is not merely  constituted by  their  reliance 
on  natural  resources and their  subsistence practices, but  rather  it  has a  cultural 
element. The rearticulation  of territory  is constituted in  a  more holistic claim,  where 
resources and nature is perceived as an  integral  part  of Inuit  culture,  and as such, the 
sustainability  of these elements are  imperative in order  to sustain  Inuit  development 
in accordance with traditional culture and self-determination:
“When  undertaking developmental  or other  activities  of any nature, 
planners and decision-makers must not simply view the Arctic as an 
exploitable frontier. Foremost, respect must be accorded to circumpolar 
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regions on the basis that they  constitute the ancestral  Inuit homeland … 
Northern development must refer  to more than  economic growth. It  must 
allow for  and facilitate spiritual, social, and cultural  development” (ICC, 
1991: 32).
Concludingly, the ICC articulates their  territorial dependency  on  the basis of user 
rights of resources and land, rather  than  property  rights to territory.  This right  to use 
of the surrounding environment does not only  provide a  sort  of territorial authority, 
but is articulated as constituting  a  vital  part of their  cultural identity  and being. It  is 
thus made clear  that  the articulation of territory  by  the ICC, elucidates the inherent 
connection  between nature,  resources and culture as constitutive of the ICC’s 
identity.  Any  development or  change in one of these elements should be considered 
in  relation  to the other, as they  function  as structural  elements under  the nodal point 
of territory,  which  constitutes an imperative element  of the ‘overall’ nodal point; the 
Inuit identity.
INUIT POPULATION
“It is critical that  Inuit  be recognised and referred to both nationally and 
internationally  as a  distinct  “people”. Inuit  are not mere “populations”  or 
“minorities”. These latter  terms serve to unfairly  deny  or undermine the 
true status, rights, and identity of Inuit as indigenous peoples. Inuit rights 
will  be advanced only if  states use accurate terminology and concepts and 
respect Inuit perspectives.” (ICC, 1991: 7)
We derived population from  a  modern  conception of sovereignty,  where its 
etymological  meaning  was simply  understood as the inhabitants of any  specified 
territory.  When described earlier,  the term  population  was inherently  bound to the 
demarcated boundaries of a  state - as the ICC in  the above quote understand it as 
well; undermining their  distinct indigenous identity.  We however, derive a more 
particular  meaning  of the concept  of population,  as it  in itself is not clear  enough  to 
identify  the Inuit,  who are of a  transnational nature. In  order  to explain  a  more 
particular  group of people living within  an  ‘unspecified area’,  we thus choose to add 
an  identifying  modifier: the ICC does not  represent  only  a  population, but  a  distinctly 
identified population. As such,  population in  itself becomes less important,  as the 
modifier  becomes significant for the conception of population. In  order  to determine 
the Inuit  as a  population, and in order  not to conflate them  with  any  other  specific 
group of the Arctic region,  we must understand what distinguishes them  from  the 
total population, and as such  add the modifier  of Inuit. Hereby, we are from  now  on 
concerned with identifying the Inuit Population (Inuit).
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At the 11th  general assembly  in  Nuuk  in 2010, it  was said that “Inuit  share a  common 
past, a common future and common challenges”. 
The discursive construction  of this commonality  is however  fairly  new. For one thing, 
the word Inuit,  meaning ‘people’ in  Inuktitut,  was not  common  in  the Arctic before 
the 1970’s when the term  Eskimo was more frequently  used (Bærenholdt,  1999: 35); 
as seen  in the quote from  1975: "We Eskimo are an international community  sharing 
common language,  culture, and a  common  land along  the Arctic  coast  of Siberia, 
Alaska, Canada  and Greenland. Although  not a nation-state, as a  people, we do 
constitute a nation." (ICC, 2012). 
Already  then  they  contested the common  assumption  of the nation-state as one 
entity  and instead made a separation  of the two.  The term  Eskimo is now  also 
replaced by  Inuit  which  signifies a  much  broader  base of identification  than  only  that 
of language, which  was the case with  the term  Eskimo22  (Bærenholdt,  1999: 35). 
This change signifies one of the first steps in which  the Inuit  people construct  their 
identity  as a  distinct people and thus,  oppose the state’s ‘monopoly’ on  a  national 
identity; dismissing  their  old colonial  identity.  This change is apparent  in  two 
specific dimensions: First, the term  Eskimo was constituted as defining  the 
traditional peoples of the Arctic  region  although constructed by  western society. 
Second,  the Eskimo identity  articulated in  earlier  deliberations within ICC 
constituted more of a lingual  commonality,  whereas the Inuit identity  is constructed 
around a  rather holistic perception  of culture,  traditions and way  of life that 
constitute them as a people. 
Another  term  frequently  used on  and by  the ICC is ‘indigenous people’.  This specific 
concept  functions as an  argument  for  the ICC’s rights; it refers to several 
international agreements recognizing specific  rights of indigenous people23. 
However,  it  does also, as the shift  from  Eskimo to Inuit,  constitute a  contestation  of 
the state as a  unitarian  actor,  as it  proposes and argues for  a  transnational  political 
identity.  In “An Inuit  Declaration on Sovereignty  in the Arctic”  the ICC outlines the 
interplay  between  Inuit and Indigenous. They  commence by  constructing  themselves 
as a  people,  stating: “[the] Inuit  are a  people”  (ICC, 2009), and following: “Inuit  are 
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22 Also Eskimo, as a term, has not originated in Inuit language but stems from European descriptions of the Arctic 
people (Thalbitzer, 1950: 564). 
23 In “the Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic” the ICC, in §1.3, mentions the following insitutions: “Charter of 
the United Nations; The international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action; the Human Rights 
Council; the Arctic Council; and the Organisation of American States. In § 1.4 they mention the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In other documents the ILO conventions 107 and 169 are often 
mentioned. 
an  indigenous people with  the rights and responsibilities of all indigenous peoples”. 
By  using the term  indigenous,  the Inuit  creates a  logic of equivalence with other 
peoples around the world, recognising  that  they  share common  characteristics, 
although  different. In this sense they  ‘step’ into an  international discourse, 
constructing a  logic  of equivalence with  indigenous movements in  Brazil, as well as 
Spain.  Through  a  narrative of Indigeneity  we will  try  to establish  some of the aspects 
that constructs the Inuit identity.
A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF INDIGENOUS DISCOURSE
Trying to define what characterises indigenous peoples and their  political  aims it 
becomes clear  that  it  can  at best be referred to as ambiguous by  nature (Niezen, 
2003: 18; Anaya, 2004: 3).  In his book “Indigenous Peoples in  International  Law” 
(2004: 3) James Anaya  broadly  defines indigenous as “...  the living  descendants of 
preinvasion  inhabitants of lands now  dominated by  others”, continuing; “Indigenous 
peoples,  nations or  communities are culturally  distinctive groups that  find 
themselves engulfed by  settler  societies born  of the forces of empire and conquest”. 
The ICC clearly  fits in  this box when  stating  how  “Inuit  have been  living  in  the Arctic 
from time immemorial”, even before colonisation (ICC, 2009). 
In  order  to understand how  the ICC,  through the construction  of a  logic of 
equivalence with  indigenous movements,  constructs an identity, opposed to and 
across state-borders, we will shortly  outline how  indigeneity  have developed in 
international fora. 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION
The International Labour  Organization  (ILO),  originating  in  1921,  was the first 
organisation  concerned with ‘native’ or ‘indigenous’ issues (Shadian,  2006: 209). In 
1957, when Convention  107  on  Indigenous and Tribal  Populations was signed,  the 
term  Indigenous was for  the first time explicitly  mentioned and connected to basic 
individual and collective  rights24  by  any  major  international  organisation (Niezen, 
2003: 36; Shadian, 2006: 209).  This stands in  sharp contrast  to the period of 
colonisation, in  which  natives were not recognised as “...  sovereign unto themselves 
nor nationals of colonising  states but [instead] were legally  considered wards”; brutal 
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24 The ILO Convention 107 on Indigenous and Tribal Populations sets out to provide “protection and integration of 
Indigenous (...) populations in independent countries”, recognising that these populations “have not yet been 
integrated into the national community”. It thus provides individual citizenship rights, land ownership rights, 
rights to equal employment and working conditions, etc. The overall focus, it is important to state, is however, 
bound to assimilation into the unitarian, homogenous nation-state (ILO 107, 1957).
treatment of natives was in this era  perceived of as “... unsound and unproductive 
colonial practice” (Niezen, 2003: 37). 
The change apparent in  convention  107  exhibits this change, often argued to have 
followed by  the ratification  of The Universal  Declaration  of Human  Rights in  1948, 
and the accompanying  recognition  of the rights of minorities (Niezen,  2003: 40).  It 
incorporates the term  indigenous,  thus exhibiting  a  shift  from  descriptions such  as 
‘primitive’,  ‘savage’ and ‘barbarians’ to the term  of indigeneity  recognising  the 
marginalised situation  of these distinct populations (Niezen, 2003: 11; 224). Neither 
the ILO convention  107  nor  the discourse on  Human Rights did however, include 
recognition of their  self-determination,  and policies of assimilation, within 
independent  states, were thus the preferred solution  to solve indigenous peoples 
marginalised situation. 
These described developments entailed the start  of formal recognitions of basic 
indigenous rights.  Furthermore, the first use of the concept  of indigeneity  in 
connection  with  basic  rights,  serves as a  critical  case from  which we can  ‘trace’ the 
‘origin’ of the nodal point  for  the construction  of the Inuit indigenous identity 25 as 
ICC interprets it.
A  change is,  once again, apparent in the move from  a  focus on  assimilation  in the 
beginning  of the post-World War  II era and onto rights of self-determination  and the 
right  to cultural integrity, through  and after  the Cold War.  During  the 1960’s 
processes of decolonisation, rising social movements and thus, the advent  of civil 
rights and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), contributed to terms such  as 
self-determination  becoming  defining of the discourse on indigenous peoples’ rights 
(Niezen 2003: 36-40).  A  further  contribution  to this discourse, was the failure of 
assimilation-policies of states (Niezen,  2003: 36).  One example of this change is the 
establishment  of the Working  Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in  1982  by 
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.  Another  is the ILO 
Convention  169  on  Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1989),  which  served to readdress 
issues from  Convention  107.  Specifically  it  focuses on  aspects of self-determination, 
ways of life,  economic  developments and cultural sustainability  and integrity,  and 
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25  The construction of identity as an object of discourse in this sense does not entail a reduction of everything to 
discourse nor does it entail a scepticism about the existence of the world. Laclau and Mouffe explains it well: "The 
fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world 
external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that 
certainly exists, in the sense that is occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as 
objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of god', depends upon the 
structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather 
different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence” 
furthermore stressing  the importance of including NGOs and indigenous peoples 
groups in  decision-making  processes (ILO 169, 1989). Very  importantly  it  also terms 
indigenous groups as peoples thus recognising their distinct character or identity 26. 
Between  the ILO convention  107  (1957) and 169  (1989)  the official  discourse shifts, 
following  an  increase in  influence and presence of indigenous peoples’ groups in  the 
formulation  of policies. Contrasting  earlier discourses,  issues of self-determination, 
ownership and traditional,  cultural integrity  moved towards the center  of 
deliberations and policies (Niezen,  2003: 45).  Following  this change, one can  identify 
a  shift, disconnecting  indigenous peoples’ rights, and the solutions adequate,  from 
the earlier  ideas of assimilation with  the nation-state.  It  thus exhibits a  logic  of 
equivalence in  which  different marginalised peoples from  across the world weakens 
their  differences and strengthens their  common feeling of being  existentially 
threatened,  oppressed and marginalised by  the actions of the nation-state; the 
antagonistic ‘other’. 
This change however, can  not  be confined only  to a structural  possibility  of the 
international system,  constructing the agent. The agency  is also highly  influential in 
structuring  the structure. Shadian, interested in  the Inuit  Indigenous identity,  traces 
an  important factor  to the “...  contact  with  and subsequent  domination  by 
Euro-Canadian  society  …”  (Shadian, 2006: 235).  She argues that  prior  to contact, 
identities and loyalties were founded in  communities and families whilst the contact 
with  colonisers have produced a  differentiation  from  Inuit  and non-Inuit  (Shadian, 
2006: 235); thus producing  a  chain  of equivalence amongst  all Inuit.  This identity 
she argues,  is both  shaped by  the international structure of Indigenous discourse, as 
well  as shaping the discourse to fit  with  the antagonistic relationship to the state. 
One can, following Keating’s argument (2002),  argue that  inclusion  in  international 
fora  together  with  new  emerging  transnational  identities produced through 
marginalisation  have produced possibilities of reconceptualising  or  transforming 
sovereignty  as international  structures increasingly  include them  as recognised 
identities. 
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26 In this context it is important note Article 1.3 of the convention which contains a disqualifying clause for the 
term peoples as used in the title of the convention. It states: "The use of the term 'peoples' in this Convention shall 
not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international 
law" (ILO 169, 1989). One can thus talk of some kind of mis-recognition as the use of the term peoples suddenly 
changes substance with regards to international law. In our analysis however, we regard the use of peoples in the 
title as an important discursive shift despite the clause.
ENGAGING WITH INTERNATIONAL DISCOURSE
The above-outlined development  of the indigenous peoples discourse,  where 
inclusion  and participation  of indigenous movements in  international policy 
deliberations increase,  two important points about  the ICC’s articulation  of identity 
and culture becomes apparent.
First,  and highly  related to our investigation  of population,  we argue that  the 
commonalities of the Inuit  identity,  are to a  large extent  articulated through 
discursive elements and structures found in  the indigenous discourse.  Second, and 
related most importantly  with the notion  of authority  and recognition, the ICC’s 
articulation  and participation  in indigenous discourse, exemplifies their  relation  with 
territory  and the construction  of identities and communities, that  transcend 
state-borders. But let us for now dwell a moment at the former point.
“Recognizing … that Inuit have the right to self-determination, including 
the right to safeguard the integrity of  the Arctic environment for  present 
and future generations, and to control their  social, economic, cultural  and 
political environment.” (ICC, 1991: 4)
The above quote, shows a  clear  correlation  between the terms used to describe the 
indigeneity  of the ICC and that  found in the preamble to Convention  169  from  the 
ILO. At  the center  of attention  are the rights of self-determination  and cultural 
integrity, in  the sense of rights to control the future and development  of culture and 
traditions.  Furthermore,  in the Inuit  Declaration  on  Sovereignty  in  the Arctic,  the 
ICC explicitly  adhere to indigenous discourse, when stating  that  “Inuit  are an 
indigenous people with  the rights and responsibilities of all  indigenous peoples. 
These include the rights recognized in and by  international legal and political 
instruments …” (ICC 2009: 1).  Insistent on referring  to international covenants, 
conventions and declarations the ICC constantly  indulge in  a discourse  of 
international cooperation  between  states and organisations in terms of recognising 
these indigenous groups, and regard the responsibility  of states to adhere to these.  As 
Kemper  notes nationalism  is “an  expression not  of a  cultural ‘ontology’ but  of the way 
human  beings use cultural forms to respond to circumstances.”  (Kemper  in Shadian, 
372: 2006).  As such, the political story  of the Inuit, through the ICC, becomes a 
discourse of collective political identity  construction  embedded in  language that 
respond to and resonate with global political discourse, such as UN-discourse. 
INUIT IDENTITY AS A DISTINCT INDIGENOUS DISCOURSE
However,  and quite important  in  this context, the ICC also differentiates themselves 
from  this indigenous discourse in  two aspects.  First,  the ICC articulates a 
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differentiation  between  Inuits and other  indigenous groups, foremost because of 
their  territorial connection  with  the Arctic  region, as they  state in  their  declaration  on 
sovereignty,  “Inuit are an  indigenous people of the  Arctic.  Our  status, rights and 
responsibilities as a  people among  the peoples of the world, and as an  indigenous 
people, are exercised within the unique geographic, environmental, cultural and 
political context  of the Arctic.”  (ICC,  2009: 1).  Second and subsequent  of the first 
point,  the ICC,  as noted above,  is distinguished from  ‘traditional’ indigenous 
movements, usually  founded on  and working within  nation-states.  The ICC is 
regional  in nature, and as a  regional Inuit institution  their  political focus is on 
regional  issues.  Following  their  strong  connection  to the Arctic  region, as pointed out 
in  the part  on  territory,  the ICC maintains a  goal of participating  in  regional  policy 
deliberations and decision-making  to ensure Inuit  cultural,  political and economical 
sustainability:
“Consistent with principles of self-government, Inuit … should have direct 
input in  the formulation  and implementation  of Arctic co-operation 
agreements between  States  for matters that  affect these peoples”  (ICC 
1991: 29).
Furthermore,  the regional identity  of the ICC has some important characteristics 
with  regards to the  construction  of the state as the antagonistic  other.  As we have 
established,  the indigenous movement differentiates itself from  the nation-state,  as it 
sees the state-system  as the prime driver  of their  oppression  and marginalisation. 
This line of thought can  also be traced in  the ICC’s writings wherein specific 
examples are also given. 
In  ICC’s document  “Principles and Elements For  a Comprehensive Arctic  Policy” the 
feeling  of being  threatened and the need for  comprehensive solutions instead of “... 
piecemeal  reactions to individual  northern problems …”  is brought  about already  in 
the introduction. They  start out  by  stating  that  if “...  the distinct  identity  and values 
of Inuit  [are] to survive,  coherent arctic policies ...  [are] deemed essential”  (ICC, 
1991: 2). They  follow  up with  explaining how  such  policies are “... too often  absent,  as 
ad hoc  decisions by  State government  increasingly  take their  toll  in the circumpolar 
North” (Ibid.). 
Consequently, a  series of examples of “harmful consequences”  such as the Exxon 
Valdez oil  spill,  transboundary  pollution, etc.  are stated; concluding that  these 
consequences “...  can  all be traced back ... to major  shortcomings or  failures in 
policy-making”  (Ibid.). It  thus becomes clear  that  the state  governments can 
essentially  be ‘blamed’ for these effects and as a  result,  become the antagonistic 
other,  opposite to which  Inuit identity  and values are posited. This position  is 
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important, as they  thus define their  own  development  as a  people; separated from 
that  of the state and hence,  contesting the basic assumption of the conflation  of 
nation  and state into one unitarian  actor  - the nation-state. The threat to the 
environment  is especially  important as the Inuit  have a  special relation  to the 
environment27. They  state that: “Inuit  are an integral part  of Arctic  ecosystems and 
have a profound relationship with  the lands,  waters, sea  ice,  and other  resources of 
the Arctic environment”  (ICC,  1991: 4).  Threats to the Arctic environment is thus 
perceived a  threat  to the Inuit  identity  and values.  Consequently,  the increase of 
globalisation  processes and herein, cross-border threats become signifiers around 
which  the Inuit, though  within  different  nation-states and communities,  can  gather 
in a weakening of differences, thereby constructing a logic of equivalence. 
THE INDIGENOUS INUIT IDENTITY
The Inuit  Indigenous identity  is thus international,  regional and transnational  in 
nature and hence, to some extend, opposing  the nation-state system. In  this way  the 
ICC is reflecting, as well  as contributing  to,  the development of a distinct Inuit 
identity.  They  construct  a  logic  of equivalence with  other  international  movements of 
indigenous peoples, in which the ICC both  structure and are structured by  the 
prevailing discourse. Transnationally  they  construct  an identity  without  a 
demarcated territory, thus contesting  the traditional conflation  of nation and state so 
often  found in  IR-theory  - as we started out: “although not a  nation-state, as a 
people, [the ICC] do constitute a  nation” (ICC,  2012). The narrative of sovereignty  in 
Westphalia; a  narrative of people within  a  delineated bound space represented by 
and recognised through  the existence of the state,  is thus contested by  the Inuit  who 
are not bound by a delineated space nor legitimately represented by a state.
Concludingly, the threat  from  internationalisation  and development  of the Arctic, 
both  environmentally  and economically  are best  handled through regional  and 
international cooperation, where the ICC seeks representation  and influence, in 
order  to sustain  their  rights of self-determination  and -government  over  matters 
influencing their  culture and identity.  The Inuit identity  thus binds them  together 
transnationally  in  order to secure a  comprehensive Arctic  policy, and internationally, 
in order  to safeguard recognition,  whilst  still  maintaining  possibilities of 
sub-national self-governments.  In  this sense they  require their  sovereignty, not 
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27  This special relationship with the environment, as a distinct characteristic of Indigenous Peoples have even 
made scholars like Michael Hart (2010), Karena Shaw (2002), Niezen (2003) and others talk of an Indigenous 
Research Paradigm. This research paradigm is based on indigenous ontology, epistemology, methodology and 
axiology; existentially different from eurocentric, western research paradigms in viewing the relationship to nature 
as inextricably linked to that of man (Niezen, 2003: 11).
through  absolute control over a  demarcated territory  and a  homogenous nation, but 
instead through  authority-sharing  and cooperation  in  different fora  to sustain  their 
livelihoods.
AUTHORITY
Under  the modern  Western paradigm,  which  is largely  constituted by  the 
Westphalian  system  as a signifier  or  order, differing  elements or  characteristics are 
gathered through  the construction of an ‘other’.  The sovereign  state system 
constituted a  chain of equivalence based on elements such  as private property  rights, 
modernity,  rationalism, civilisation, capitalism  and liberalism. The ‘other’; in  this 
example,  the indigenous Inuit,  contributed to the constitution  of the Westphalian 
order, by  representing a discourse of pre-modernity,  irrationalism  and 
traditionalism; functioning  as the antagonistic pole opposite of that inside the 
state-system. Simply  put,  the sovereign state system, with  its reproductive logic 
wherein processes of colonisation followed, constituted the Inuit as a symbolic other.
Sovereignty  as explained so far, has been  laid out as a  modern notion  of authority, 
where the source of legitimacy  has resided in  ideas and practices,  such as territorial 
integrity  and nationalism, constitutive to modernity. The narrative of sovereignty  in 
modernity  has been  a  narrative of people in  a demarcated space; the recognition  of 
state sovereignty  has been  a  recognition  of a  nation’s omnipotence and sovereign 
capability. However, as we have noticed, modernity  cannot be confined to a  single 
logic  or  prevailing  paradigm. Rather, all systems are constantly  vulnerable to change 
and contestation. It  has been  asserted that the Inuit  have their  own  episteme of 
knowledge and thus,  their  own  conceptualisation  of what constitutes authority  and 
governance.  If “Governance is a  social function  centered on efforts to steer  human 
actions toward collective outcomes that are beneficial to society”  (AGP,  2010: 4),  the 
conception  of authority  of the ICC  should be understood through  the means,  which 
the ICC choose to employ  in  order  to reach  their  aims.  Barnaby  confirms (2009: 4): 
“In  many  Indigenous languages, the concept of governance is understood as ‘our  way 
of life’ or ‘our  life’, therefore, understanding  the patterns of life for  Indigenous 
peoples provides insight into the patterns of governance.” 
Gail  Fondahl  and Stephanie Irlbacher-Fox  describe how  the logic  of Inuit  sharing 
and management  of resources differs significantly  from  Western  logic; the Inuit 
mode of governance relies on  what  is often  referred to as ‘traditional knowledge’; a 
communicative “high-context” cultural approach,  wherein  “Arctic  and subarctic 
hunter-gatherers and pastoralists,  oral  cultures [require] socio-cultural fluency  or 
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knowing as the basis for  the conduct  of what others would recognize as governance”, 
whereas many  Western,  European-based societies differ  by  relying on “low-context” 
communicative approaches,  “which employ  written rules, contracts,  and systems 
predicated on  a hierarchy  and delegation  of authority”  (Fondahl  and Irlbacher-Fox, 
2009: 2). Indigenous governance and traditional knowledge is thus highly  concerned 
with beliefs, values and worldviews of Indigenous cultures. 
As Fondahl  and Irlbacher-Fox  argue,  Inuit governance relies on  among  other  things, 
decision-making by  consensus,  being  a  part  of the environment, using resources 
wisely  for  the common  good and respecting  diversity. Followingly,  indigenous Inuit 
discourse differs from  Western  discourse; concepts of self-determination, 
sovereignty,  statehood and authority  are all  attributed meanings of another episteme 
than  the one constituting  Western  modern liberal thought.  Laclau  (2000: xi) state 
how  we need to search  for  such  differing  forms of articulations and re-articulations 
of elements and conditions,  which  constitutes and enables authority.  It  has further 
been  argued that  in  order  to understand sovereignty,  we must understand the claims 
to it.  Sovereign  recognition  is in many  ways embodied by  the notion  of authority. 
Leonard (2005) suggests that the simplest  way  to understand sovereignty  is as “a 
claim to supreme rule.” 
From  Louis XIV’s sunny  rule to Rousseau's idea  of sovereign authority 28,  as 
something  essentially  vested in  the general will of the people,  the extent to which  and 
how  absolute sovereign authority  is considered perpetual  or  indivisible,  has changed. 
The conception of what  constitutes the legitimate and absolute authority 
subsequently  varies both  in  time and space; internally  and externally. As Jackson 
explained, a  state  may  have a  strong  authority  vested in  international  norms, 
constituting  an  external  form  of sovereignty, which  may  though  not necessarily  equal 
an  efficient  or  strong  internal  rule29.  The understanding  and degree of exclusivity  of 
jurisdiction  and absolute authority  considered justified for  sovereign recognition, 
constitute indicators for the relocation and reconceptualisation of sovereignty.
INUIT AUTHORITY AS SELF-DETERMINATION
“... as the European Union, evolve. Sovereignties overlap and are 
frequently  divided within  federations in  creative ways to recognize the 
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28 There is an important distinction between Hobbes and Rousseau: Hobbes believe that the people transfer their 
sovereignty,whereas Rousseau maintain that the people stay sovereign.
29 A clear example of this, can be the governments in exile during WW2. They were considered sovereign, despite 
the fact that their territories were occupied. However, the opposite also often occurs;  An elected state may have a 
strong domestic popular legitimate consent to rule as the final authority internally, but may not be recognised by 
other states in international relations, e.g. previous Palestine
rights of peoples ... For  the Inuit ... issues of  sovereignty and sovereign 
rights must be examined ... in  the context of our long history of struggle ... 
as  an Arctic indigenous people having the right to exercise 
self-determination over our lives, territories, cultures and languages” 
(ICC, 2009: 2)
The ICC articulate their  understanding of sovereignty  in  the present  era,  as 
something, which  is not  necessarily  absolute,  but  can  overlap and be divided between 
different  actors. As sovereignty  is claimed overlapping, the claim  to 
self-determination  does thus not  necessarily  infringe upon  an  unquestionable, 
absolute conception  of authority.  Hereby, the traditional  notion  of absolute authority 
laid out  above,  is contested: whereas the sovereign authority  has been  inextricably 
bound to,  and manifested itself on,  a closed-off territory,  the ICC’s rearticulation  of 
sovereignty  is shaped by  its established logic and interpretation  of territory, which 
was defined above in meaningful cultural and symbolic  terms,  defining Inuit identity 
and livelihood. Authority  is thus not considered an  absolute right  to rule or  own  land 
and people,  but  rather  the ICC’s notion  of authority  is one of self-determination and 
sovereign  recognition  as a  distinct people.  In  the above quote the concepts of 
sovereignty  and self-determination,  identity  and territory, form  a  chain  of 
equivalence given  new  meaning  by  the ICC. This self-determination  is legitimised by 
a  myth  of their  “long history  of struggle”, wherein  the affirmation  of sovereign 
self-determination  serves as a  legitimate process of recognition,  otherwise known 
through a nation’s attainment of statehood.
SELF-DETERMINATION THROUGH SELF-GOVERNMENT
The right to self-determination  over cultural  integrity  and traditional way  of life is 
accomplished through processes of self-government:
“Inuit  can only  continue to develop as  a  distinct people by  exercising 
adequate powers of self-government within  their  traditional  territories  … 
For purposes  of  self-government, Inuit have the right to determine their 
own  institutions, according to the circumstances and needs in their 
respective regions … To maximize Inuit self-determination within  states, 
the powers of  institutions of self-government must include the exercise of 
jurisdiction and control over lands and waters.” (ICC 1991: 13)
The ICC’s articulation  of authority  is of both  a  devolved and localised nature.  As 
noted in  the above sections on  territory  and population, the ICC articulates a  regional 
identity,  through which  Inuit  communities are  bound together  by  their  common 
interest in  sustaining  the Arctic  Inuit environment and culture,  as a  precondition  for 
local  self-determination. As a consequence of the collective Inuit  identity, and in  line 
with  their  claim  to authority  in  terms of self-government, the ICC  articulates a  strong 
Rearticulating Sovereignty in the Arctic
41 / 64
emphasis on  their  inclusion  in  the formulation and deliberations on  regional Arctic 
policies and agendas:
“[The Arctic] region  includes the Inuit homeland, which transcends the 
geographical  boundaries of [the region] … Numerous problems of the 
Arctic transcend the jurisdictional boundaries of states and can only  be 
effectively  dealt  with through  international  cooperation, between and 
among peoples and governments … The ICC provides an  ideal  forum for 
Inuit from the various Arctic states  to engage in  social and cultural 
relations  and work together  on a wide range of  economic, social, cultural 
and environmental  questions pertaining to Inuit and the Arctic … It is 
recognized that Arctic policy issues are increasingly transnational  in 
scope. In  order to ensure coherence and consistency  from one state 
jurisdiction to another, regional  cooperation and coordination  are 
essential  … Consistent with  principles of self-government, Inuit and other 
northern  peoples  should have direct input in the formulation  and 
implementation of Arctic co-operation  agreements between States for 
matters that affect these peoples.” (ICC, 1991: 28-29)
We see a  clear distinction between  the domestic relations of Inuit self-government, 
where the focus is on  the attainment  of land usage and ownership rights,  centered 
around specific  local communities supported by  the ICC, and the regional role of the 
ICC. The regional role of the ICC serves as a  way  of coordinating  domestic  responses, 
ensuring  “coherence and consistency”,  in  the end safeguarding  the distinct identity  of 
the Inuit; an identity  essentially  transnational in  nature.  Also,  the participation  in 
regional  and international political fora  has produced a  possibility  for participation 
within new policy-areas.
This is made quite obvious by  the fact  that  the ICC has not only  included 
deliberations and policy  initiatives on  Inuit  self-government, cultural integrity  and 
sustainability  in  their  comprehensive policy,  but also include their  take on 
militarisation, mining  developments and security  issues in  the Arctic, such  as the 
possible establishment of an  Arctic  Nuclear  Weapons Free Zone.  The ICC thus 
advance their  claim  to local Inuit self-determination  through  regional arrangements 
and aspiration  for international membership, in  order  to meet  transnational 
challenges perceived to have local impacts:
“How could ICC’s input into a particular  international forum  help our 
people at the local level?” or  “What international  forum  would best assist 
with  a  particular local  or regional  problem?” and ... “How can  we use the 
strength of the larger  Inuit community  that crosses Greenland, Canada, 
Alaska and Chukotka to address local  or  regional  concerns? ... And why is 
this collective voice on international  matters  important? Because it makes 
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a difference in  the lives of Inuit  as the local level. ICC does not address or 
suicide rates, or individual  poverty  directly. ICC does not develop small 
businesses, or educate our children  in our communities. We have 
organizations in  the Inuit  family  that do that. ICC, however, does address 
these challenges by  acting globally  in areas that impact upon these 
issues.” (ICC and Lynge in Shadian, 2006: 58)
Like this,  the ICC pursue local governance through  regional structures. The ICC’s 
perception  of self-determination, as articulated in  the quote, does not  compete with 
the state arrangements under  which  the ICC belong. The members of the ICC 
recognise their  citizenship of and the individual rights linked to their  respective 
member  states, which provide them  social services, economic re-distribution, 
structures for  political participation  and so forth. However, these positionings are 
perceived ‘inadequate’  to address the challenges and threats conceptualised by  the 
ICC, to the Inuit  as a nation, as the state system  itself is perceived as the antagonistic 
other opposed to which Inuit identity is constructed. 
SHARED AUTHORITY IN REGIONAL GOVERNANCE
The ICC’s aim  is not to eliminate the states’ authority  in  regional matters concerning 
the Arctic, but rather to complement and transcend it:
“The conduct of international relations in the Arctic and the resolution  of 
international  disputes in  the Arctic are not the sole preserve of Arctic 
states or other  states; they are also within the purview of  the Arctic’s 
indigenous peoples. The development of international  institutions in  the 
Arctic, such  as  multi-level  governance systems and indigenous peoples’ 
organizations, must transcend Arctic states’ agendas on  sovereignty  and 
sovereign rights and the traditional  monopoly claimed by states in  the 
area of foreign affairs.” (ICC, 2009: 4)
Whilst the ICC do not  contest  the inherent authority  of the state, the ICC do,  in  their 
pursuit of complementary  authority  and self-determination in  regional and global 
governance,  contest  the monopoly  of authority  of the states. Rather  than  relying  on 
domestic influences from  Inuit groups,  the ICC have created an  encompassing 
institution, with  the aim  of representing  Inuit  communities and their  common 
aspirations in  the international realm, in  order  to conserve and sustain  Inuit identity. 
In  their  acknowledgement  of the state as a  legitimate actor, they  exhibit  the 
paradoxical relationship between  the Inuit  identity  and the state. On  one hand, they 
are reliant on  the state as the antagonistic  other,  as they  construct their  identity 
around notions of marginalisation  produced by  the state. Building their  identity 
around notions of marginalisation, they  are able to construct a  logic of equivalence 
with  other  indigenous peoples and followingly  receive internationally  established 
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rights. On  the other  hand,  the ICC  rely  on  the nation-states because 
self-government-structures enabling  their  self-determination  are not  in  place.  In  this 
sense the do not claim  secession,  but autonomy. This can  be considered a  logic  of 
difference,  in  which  the Inuit as a  transnational collective weakens their 
commonalities.  This enables them  to put forth  a  legitimate claim  to authority  within 
their  respective nation-states. The move stands in opposition to how  the ICC have 
responded to other  challenges,  usefully  constructing logics of equivalence,  and thus 
exhibits a  critical  point telling  something  about to what degree they  have been  able to 
push through their  re-articulations of sovereignty  shut   in  the authority  discourse. 
They  are in  this regard, to a  high  degree, bound by  a Westphalian  conception  of 
authority  and acts within  this episteme despite their  antagonistic  relationship to 
exactly this. 
Consequently, the ICC express the need for  construction  of “creative governance 
arrangements tailored to diverse circumstances in states,  regions and communities”, 
in  order  to compromise and balance the rights of indigenous communities,  with  the 
communities and states they  live in  and together  with  (ICC 2009: 2). The ICC  thus 
advocate for  Inuit communities’ autonomy  and rights of self-determination,  while 
explicitly denying exclusion from participation in the regional state society. 
AN INUIT POLITY IN A GLOBALISED WORLD ORDER
The ICC’s pursuit  of sovereign  recognition,  is highly  based upon their  narrative of a 
national collective identity,  stemming  “... from  time immemorial”. Like this, the ICC 
engages in  a  relationship with  the prevailing  discourse of international society, 
wherein  the legitimate source of sovereign recognition  is seen  as a  people’s right to 
protect  and express themselves as a  nation.  However,  and in  order  for  us to be able 
to conceptualise the ICC as an  autonomous agent  qualifying for  sovereign 
recognition  and membership in  present-day  international society, they  need not  only 
a  narrative of a  collective identity,  but  a  political structure and purpose comparable 
to the ones of states.  Here we find it  useful to conceptualise the ICC as a  polity, as 
this conceptualisation can  arguably  serve as a  comparison  to the conceptualisation  of 
known sovereign actors; namely states. 
The New  Oxford American  Dictionary  describes a  polity  as “a  form  or  process of civil 
government  or  constitution; an  organized society; a  state as a  political entity”. The 
term  origins from  the Greek  politeia,  which  means ‘citizenship,  government’.  A  polity 
can  thus be conceptualised as a  form  of political agency, based upon  governance 
structures.
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Drawing  on Ferguson and Mansbach,  Shadian (2006: 31) conceptualises a  polity  as 
an  entity  with  “political capacity  to mobilize people and resources for  political 
purposes”.  Further,  they  argue how  a  polity  also has a  distinct identity. Thus, for 
Ferguson  and Mansbach,  a  polity  is not merely  a  politically  distinct  identity, but 
rather, it  is a  community  with  a  distinct  identity, which  act  politically  to pursue its 
goals.  Recognising the Essex  School though, the construction  of discourses and 
identities “always involve the exercise of power,  as their  constitution involves the 
exclusion of certain  possibilities and a  consequent  structuring  of the relations 
between  different  social agents.”  (Howarth,  Norval  and Stavrakakis 2000: 4). 
Following  this argument,  the construction  of an Inuit identity  in  itself involves the 
exercise of political capacity,  as it  is constructed as an  antagonistic pole to the state. 
The distinction  between political  identity  and capacity  blurs here,  and the concepts 
are inextricably  bound together  by  this logic of discourse.  Going back  to the Greek 
‘politeia’, a  polity  does essentially  represent an action,  which  is not  necessarily  bound 
to territorial integrity  or  Western  liberal thought.  Thus, we acknowledge the need to 
conceptualise the ICC as an  agency  comparable to states,  but do not  perceive the ICC 
as an  independent entity  in  itself.  Instead, we will,  when  conceptualising  them  as a 
polity,  acknowledge them  as actions and outcomes of constant processes of 
governance and power construction, contingent on social and historical contexts.
The conceptualisation of the ICC as a  polity  thus enables us to give  meaning  and 
relevance to the processual construction  of the ICC and it’s subsequent claim  to 
sovereignty.  Concludingly,  we find that conceptualising the ICC as a  polity  allow  us to 
view  the ICC  as an  autonomous, organised and political agency  complementary  to 
conventional  state definitions, as polities “may  be hierarchically  layered, partially 
overlapping, nested, or (rarely) isolated” (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004: 86).
Furthermore,  and according  to Shadian (2006: 31) “polities have a  hierarchy  in 
which  certain individuals speak  or act on  behalf of those persons identifying  with  the 
polity”. In  this sense we will  argue that  the ICC is not only  a  polity, but  indeed an 
autonomous polity: they  speak on behalf of the autonomous self-governing units of 
Nunavut, Greenland and the North  Slope Borough, when participating in  policy 
deliberations as Permanent  Participants in  the Arctic Council.  Speaking  on  behalf of 
its constituent  parts,  the ICC, as a  polity,  can  be considered exercising some degree of 
authority 30.  These constituent  parts of the ICC  are ‘below’ the state-level, exercising 
some autonomy  over  specific policy  areas,  such as resource control, subsistence 
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30 This authority, however, is often constrained. ICC argues that they should be included as “active partners in all 
future deliberations on Arctic sovereignty” (ICC, 2009). The Ilulissat Declaration is one of the cases in which Inuit 
have not been included, and followingly receives critique throughout the writings of the ICC. The Arctic Council on 
the other hand is one of the positive cases in which “a direct, participatory role for Inuit” is provided. 
hunting  policies and so forth; safeguarding Inuit self-determination  over  these areas, 
while at the same time complementing  the state. Thus authority  can be given  to the 
ICC, as it  functions as a  binding  institution  for  the regional Inuit identity  and 
represents them in regional and global fora.
GLOBALISATION AND POLITIES
New  approaches of international society  to policies on  Indigenous peoples have 
produced a  room  for  Inuit  and other indigenous peoples in regional 
intergovernmental  and international fora,  to engage in  and govern their  own 
development. In  the forthcoming  section,  we will argue that the room  produced for 
new  normative ideas combining  self-determination  and indigeneity,  can  be usefully 
seen in  the light of the means and new  agendas provided by  processes of 
globalisation. These have arguably  led to opportunities of hegemonisation  of 
agendas, by groups that were not otherwise capable of doing so (Keating, 2002: 13).
Globalisation does not  only  produce new  possibilities for  non-state actors in  political 
decision-making processes.  The processes of globalisation  also shape these actors’ 
identities. It  has through  an  examination  of ICC-discourse been argued that  the 
Westphalian  connection  between  authority  and territory  has been  redefined to an 
Inuit idea of self-determination  and land usage.  It  can  be further  argued that this 
redefinition  has gained momentum,  as the connection  between  authority  and 
territory  is already  under transformation  and redefinition  by  the processes of 
globalisation. Jan  Aart Scholte, who understands globalisation  as “the spread of 
supraterritorial  or  transborder  relations”  argues that changes cannot  be reduced to a 
new  or  old order,  as systems operate aside each  other  and “the territorialist 
assumptions which underpin modern  understandings of ‘international relations’ 
have [thus] become untenable”  (Scholte, in  Ferguson  and Mansbach,  2004: 7).  We 
will now  undertake a  theoretical examination,  arguing  that  ongoing  transformation, 
intensified by  processes of globalisation, leads to possibilities and identities of 
agency, shaping  each  other  and interacting co-constitutively; resulting  in  constantly 
developing and differing structures and manifestations of authority. 
MANAGING SOVEREIGNTY
Christopher  Rudolph  (2005) argues, like Leonard (2001),  that sovereignty  can  be 
understood essentially  as an affirmation  of authority. Before we localised this 
affirmation  of sovereign authority  internally  and externally,  and the criteria  for 
determining sovereign  jurisdiction  was characterised as based upon  demarcated 
geographical boundaries. Rudolph  also notices how  sovereign  affirmation of 
authority  in  modernity  was based upon  accumulation  and securitisation  of goods. 
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However,  he argues that  sovereign affirmation of authority, in  the current era  of 
globalisation, seems to be based upon the ability  to manage flows of goods.  Opposite 
interdependence theoreticians,  he claims (2005: 3)  that “the transgression  of borders 
becomes an  essential affirmation  of sovereignty  (...) It  is an  expression  of choice - of 
authority” 31. Following  this logic,  Rudolph  suggests that the increase, or  possible 
loss of,  sovereign  authority  can  be best  understood through  ‘sovereignty  bargains’32: 
actors’  exchanges and trade-offs between  different constitutive dimensions of 
sovereignty 33 (2005: 16-17). James Rosenau  (2006: 111)  follows a  similar  logic, as he 
states that  “autonomy  means being  free to select  the ways in  which interdependence 
with  other  individuals, groups,  provinces, states and international organizations is 
established.”  In  the following  section, we adopt  the logic of Rudolph and argue that 
sovereignty  is more than merely  a  contingent  process; it  is a  multi-dimensional  and 
relational  process of engagement  and choice; power  construction  and constitution. 
Furthermore,  we will, in an attempt  to reconsider  the state-bound status of sovereign 
authority, explore Rosenau’s views on state and non-state actors. 
Rosenau  (1990: 40-45) makes a  distinction  between  states as sovereignty-bound 
institutions,  and non-state actors as sovereign-free actors. One could from  this 
assume that  non-state actors are not possessing neither  legitimacy  nor  authority  in 
international society.  However,  Rosenau’s use of the terms of fragmentation  and 
integration34, which he employs to describe interplay  between  non-state  actors and 
states,  shows quite the contrary. He states that  “the temporal dimensions of 
governance [are] no less significant  than  the spatial dimensions ...  networking 
organizations have become as important as hierarchical ones,  and posit  shifts of 
authority  to sub-national, transnational,  and non-governmental levels as normal” 
(Rosenau  in  Leonard, 2001: 414).  The sovereign  state system  is thus arguably 
undergoing ‘fragmentation’, pushed forth  by  political  agency  embedded in differing 
forms of non-state actors, such  as polities.  This simoustanly  leads to increasing 
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31  “In contrast, it is only when choice is constrained by exogenous forces that one could argue sovereign authority 
has been circumscribed.” (Rudolph, 2005: 3)
32  Rudolph (2005) highlights the case of the European Union, as an example of a possibility to increase authority 
by choice, in dimensions, which can neither be understood geographically nor confined to usual internal-external 
divisions of statehood.
33  Rudolph mentions different economic and societal dimensions of sovereignty; leading to interdependence, 
societal and domestic sovereignties (Rudolph, 2005: 17)
34  Fragmentation understod as a form of erosion from non-state actors below the ‘sovereignty-level’ of the state; 
TNCs, ethnicities, social movements etc.; sometimes described as resulting in heterogenisation. Integration 
understood as an erosion from above; supranational structures,such as the EU, but also increasing regional 
cooperation; sometimes described as resulting in homogenisation.
regional  and international governance systems; resulting  in  what  Rosenau  perceives 
as new structures of ‘integration’. 
We have found the ICC’s autonomous authority  in  two levels.  First, we found that the 
Inuit communities and self-governing  units represented by  the ICC,  often  exercise 
authority  autonomously  from  the states,  thus constituting a  sort of fragmentation. 
Second, we found that  the ICC itself exercises autonomous authority  within  regional 
governance structures,  such  as the Arctic  Council; comparable to Rosenau’s notion  of 
integration. 
AUTONOMOUS POLITIES
Rosenau  perceived sovereignty  as inextricably  tied to the state and hence,  in  decline. 
Whether  the sovereign  statehood system  is contested, in  decline or  already 
redundant has been  touched upon  throughout  this paper. However, the question 
originally  posed in  our  problem  formulation  does not seek  to answer this.  Rather, it 
seeks to reconsider  whether  sovereignty  as a  concept  can  entail other  actors than 
those of states.  In  relation to this, Rosenau’s grant  of authority  and autonomy  to 
non-state actors initiate several considerations for  our  findings.  Firstly, it can  be 
argued that  Rosenau’s locus of political agency  is fixed in  his use of authority  and 
autonomy  rather than in  his conceptualisation of sovereignty  (Rosenau  in  Leonard, 
2001: 414). Followingly  and second,  this grant  of political agency  to transnational 
and non-state actors,  highlights important  aspects of the possibly  declining 
importance of territorial integrity, as constitutive to the exercise of authority. 
Through  processes of integration and fragmentation - constituted equally  by 
non-state actors and states - Rosenau  emphasises among  other  things, the increasing 
authority  of transnational  agency  gathering  around and aiming  for  legitimacy  based 
on for example, cultural rather than territorial integrity. 
What  should be apparent  above, is that  Rosenau’s differentiation of authority  and 
sovereignty,  is not necessarily  valid to our  reasoning.  We have conceptualised 
sovereignty  as a  claim  to authority  and hence, political agency,  which manifests itself 
through  - and is constituted by  - ongoing transforming  dimensions and contesting 
understandings.  Thus, instead of dismissing  sovereignty, as a substantial attribute of 
states as Rosenau does,  we dismiss sovereign  authority  as confined to be expressed 
through  territorial integrity  and statehood. Rather,  we re-interpret the argument  of 
political agency  as embedded in  authority,  and argue that  the Inuit  conception  of 
self-determination  and autonomy  through  self-governance,  constitutes a  conception 
of authority, which  provide transnational non-state agency,  such  as an Inuit  polity, 
with  authoritative structures comparable to what we have presented as sovereign 
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authority.  We thus conceptualise the ICC as a  transnational  polity  with  a  possibility 
of attaining  sovereign  authority; noticing  that this authority  does not necessarily 
manifest  itself territorially  or  through  statehood but  through  mechanisms of 
recognition,  as sovereignty  essentially  is seen  as a  social arrangement.  Finally,  we 
assert  that  political agency  can be localised both  within  states and polities,  and that 
new  sovereign  authorities are likely  to manifest their claims on  the basis of Rosenau’s 
understanding  of autonomous non-state actors; through  cultural  and transnational 
commonalities.
Processes of globalisation have provided an  opportunity  to understand the ICC 
outside of the state sovereignty  paradigm. Globalisation  has arguably  resulted in a 
restructuring  and movement of political  agency  in  governance processes; from 
restricting  de jure sovereignty  to a  de facto,  enabling  sovereignty  based on 
self-determination  and self-governance,  as described by  Rudolph. In  the above, we 
have concluded a  de-territorialisation of legitimate authority  structures; the ICC 
show  rising polity  constructions, which  are not  necessarily  tied to state institutions 
or  territorial  integrity  in  order  to gain  voice in international politics.  In  the next 
session, we will scrutinise ICC’s legitimisation  of their  sovereignty  claim, in  internal 
as well  as external fora; all  dependent on  intersubjective understandings of what  is 
legitimate and can  be granted recognition. We will thus attempt to understand ICC’s 
sovereignty  claim  as forming a  relative part  of a  possible intersubjective 
transformation.
Rearticulating Sovereignty in the Arctic
49 / 64
RECOGNITION
The UN  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous  Peoples (2007: 2) 
“[Recognises] the urgent need to respect  and promote the inherent rights 
of indigenous peoples which derive from their  political, economic and 
social  structures and from their  cultures, spiritual  traditions, histories 
and philosophies, especially  their  rights to their  lands, territories and 
resources”
The Inuit, shaping  a collective political identity  or polity,  need not only  internal de 
facto functioning, but  also recognition  in  international institutions and declarations, 
in  order  to gain  membership in  international  society.  Throughout the chapters on 
territory,  population  and authority  we have analysed and conceptualised how  the ICC 
re-articulate the elements, as well as how  they  are structured by  these elements. 
Following  our  constructivist  epistemology  these articulations does,  however,  not 
become significant until they  are intersubjectively  established or  recognised 
externally. Below  we will examine the possible recognition  of the different elements 
of sovereignty, in  order  to explain  the hegemonising  effects of the ICC’s 
re-articulation  of the elements, and thereby  discuss the possibility  of the ICC as a 
recognised sovereign actor.
TERRITORIAL RECOGNITION
ICC’s articulation  of territory  is different  from  the Westphalian understanding in 
several dimensions.  In  their  claim  to sovereignty  they  do not articulate a  claim  to 
territorial integrity  in  an absolute sense.  Instead they  pursue shared authority  and 
self-determination  through notions of autonomy  and Indigenous rights.  The right  to 
autonomy  and self-determination  has been  defined as best  understood 
complementary to the state. 
This kind of autonomy  can  be found recognised on  two levels. Firstly,  at  domestic 
level in  land claim  agreements, which  have been  negotiated and settled between Inuit 
communities and states,  since the first modern  agreement settled in  1971; the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement  Act  (Young & Einarsson, 2004: 97). Secondly,  these land 
claim  agreements have been  pushed forward by  international  agreements such  as the 
UN Human  Rights Council’s recognition  of Article 27  of the International  Covenant 
on  Civil  and Political Rights, which  in relation  to indigenous communities state that 
“traditional land tenure is an aspect of the enjoyment of culture”. 
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In  the following section  we will  focus on  the significance of the land claims 
agreements, which  recognises Inuit rights and belonging  to land. This dimension 
arguably  reveals the most  significant  recognition of specific Inuit  ideas of territory. 
In  the declaration on Sovereignty  in  the Arctic,  the ICC mention how  land claims in 
Canada  and Alaska are “some of the key  building  blocks of Inuit  rights … [as]  they 
remain of vital relevance to matters of self-determination  and of sovereignty  and 
sovereign  rights“  (ICC,  2009).  Focusing  on  domestic land claims agreements, we 
acknowledge that  they  are made possible because of the international  recognition  of 
Indigenous rights, to which  the ICC also ascribe. As Shadian  says: “the Inuit  land 
claims are  an institutional  affirmation  of indigenous rights to attain  political 
privilege as a collectivity.” (Shadian, 2006: 151).
It was stated in  the section  of territory  that  the Inuit  conceptualisation  of territory 
does not evolve around ownership to territory  and land as property,  but  rather  that 
their  pursuit  of land concerns rights to sustain  Inuit  cultural integrity  and livelihood. 
The Inuit land claims agreements have been  highly  influenced by  this user 
right-based approach to territory.
The fact  that  the land claims have been  negotiated and agreed upon, shows that  the 
Inuit are recognised as the original and the rightful owners of the land - in  sharp 
opposition to earlier, where they  were granted demarcated territories inherently 
controlled by  the state.  The distinction  between  grant and agreement is in  this matter 
of great  importance, as a  grant is most  often  considered a  paternalistic recognition. 
An agreement on  the other  hand,  recognises the equal character  of the two parties. 
Agreements such  as the Nunavut  Land Claim  Agreement and the Alaska  Native 
Claims Settlement Act exemplify  this.  They  have resulted in  large surface areas being 
‘sold’ by  Inuit  to states - here,  Canada  and USA  - in  exchange for  “specified tracts of 
lands and for a  once-and-for-all monetary  compensation”  (Young  & Einarsson, 
2004: 97). Measured in  control over  surface areas the Nunavut  agreement gave up 
82% of the aboriginal territories in  which  Inuit  resided (Young  & Einarsson,  2004: 
97).  In  order to understand how  such  an  agreement  is considered a  “key  building 
block of Inuit  rights”  (ICC,  2009) one has to bear  in  mind that  ICC’s understanding 
of territory  is not confined to being  a  demarcator  of authority,  but rather  their 
cultural integrity  serves this purpose of legitimacy  and authority. This is 
accommodated by  exchanging  demarcated state-controlled territories with tracts of 
land.  As tracts of land are defined as “of indefinite extent”, this term  fits with the 
Inuit understanding of territory; not exclusive and demarcated as that of the state.
The land claims can thus be understood as an  institutional  reification  and 
recognition  of Inuit indigenous self-determination  and rights to attain  privilege and 
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protection  as a  collective identity.  This recognition  of rights is distinct from  the one 
recognised through  statehood; the Inuit land right  is one of collective cultural 
integrity and identity, rather than one of individual rights and citizenship. 
RECOGNITION OF THE INUIT POPULATION
The incorporation  of Indigeneity  into the source of legitimacy  of the ICC,  provides 
the Inuit  with  internationally  recognised rights and a collective identity  in 
international fora.
As we laid out in the chapter  on population,  the ICC construct  their  identity  drawing 
heavily  on  indigenous discourse. Their  identity  is to a  large extent based on the 
notion of the state as oppressing, marginalising and existentially  threatening to the 
Inuit. As we also elaborated on  in the population  chapter, the indigenous discourse 
developed out of a discourse on  ‘savages’,  ‘primitives’ and ‘barbarians’,  into a 
discourse of indigeneity,  developed,  structuring  and structured by  indigenous 
peoples themselves.  This discourse has gained legitimacy  as it  increasingly  engages 
with the discourse of global politics.
Resolution  626 of  the United Nations General  Assembly states  that “The 
right of peoples  freely  to use and exploit their natural  wealth and 
resources is inherent in  their sovereignty and is in accordance with the 
Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations”.
The rights of peoples “inherent  in  their  sovereignty”  have, as explained, often  been 
pursued through  statehood. Rather  than  antagonising  this discourse though,  the 
claim  to sovereign  rights and recognition  of the ICC is sought  recognised in 
UN-discourse.  Furthermore, the ICC do, through their  indigenous identification, 
re-articulate and redefine this discourse, by  creating, participating in, and using  a 
discourse of Indigeneity.
Especially  the Declaration  on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is often  referenced in 
ICC documents.  Recognising  much  of the same characteristics as can  be found in  the 
discourse of the ICC,  the declaration maintains “[concern] that  indigenous peoples 
have suffered from  historic injustices as a result of,  inter  alia, their  colonization and 
dispossession  of their  lands, territories and resources,  thus preventing  them  from 
exercising,  in  particular,  their  right to development  in  accordance with  their  own 
needs and interests.”  (UN RIP, 2007). This right to development  with  ones needs and 
interests,  corresponds to the argument  of marginalisation as legitimising 
self-determination,  made in  the chapter  on population.  Thus,  we perceive a  clear 
recognition of the importance of self-determination.
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Moreover, and in  relation to the sustainable development  and maintenance of Inuit 
culture, the ICC advocate for  their  participation  on  the grounds of their  specific  and 
wide-ranging  traditional  knowledge about  the Arctic region  and Inuit  way  of life. 
This is recognised throughout  declarations from  the Arctic Council.  Specifically,  the 
Arctic  Council recognises the “importance of the use of Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ 
traditional  knowledge and capacity-building initiatives in  the planning and 
implementation of measures to adapt to climate change”.  This is followed by  an 
encouragement  for  the continued support  for  the University  of the Arctic,  a  regional 
cooperative network of educational  institutions, and its “contribution  in  developing 
specialized education aimed at  building  capacity  and fostering traditional and 
scientific knowledge relevant to Indigenous Peoples …” (AC, 2011).
The ICC has obtained recognition  as a people and has pursued this recognition  on 
the basis of prevailing legitimate norms,  as well as they  have contributed to a 
legitimisation  of indigenous discourse and ideas of traditional knowledge. 
Concludingly, it  has been emphasised how  the ICC has entered global political 
discourse, as well as,  through  the international concept of indigeneity,  attempted to 
redefine and re-articulate  this. The ICC is thus in  their  own terms recognised as a 
people and can  pursue recognition  and self-determination over  issue-areas, 
contrasting earlier policies of assimilation.
RECOGNISING AUTHORITY AS SELF-DETERMINATION
As laid out in  the chapter  on  authority, we have found communities within  the 
structures of the ICC that  exercise authority  autonomously  from  the state  in  which 
they  reside. We contextualised this autonomy  by  Rosenau’s use of fragmentation, 
and further,  we examined how  the ICC, can  be considered as exercising,  autonomous 
authority  within  regional governance structures; thus contributing  to integrating 
structures. The Inuit  polity  has thus been determined autonomous as they  are 
partially  free to negotiate and choose whether  to engage in  international, regional or 
domestic fora, such  as the Arctic  Council  or  the Nunavut.  Despite being built  on 
authority-sharing  rather  than  absolute claims, the ICC carry  autonomy  and 
authority,  and can display  new  conceptions of sovereignty  as overlapping,  subjective 
and decentralised.
As discussed,  some land claim  agreements between Inuit  communities and states 
have included rights to self-government based on  traditional  Inuit  values and 
culture. The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement is a  classic example of such 
agreement.  Aside from  specifying tracts of land and monetary  compensation, the 
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Nunavut  Land Claims Agreement  also establishes the Nunavut  Public Government 
(Young  and Einarsson  2004: 97-98). The Nunavut government  is distinguished from 
other Canadian  provinces and territories in  that  it  is based on  consensus agreements 
in  the parliament (Nunavut  Government,  2012).  The aim  of consensus agreements 
have been made as a  means for accommodating  the traditional  Inuit  notion  of 
authority  and decision-making. The special governance system, in  which  all are 
independent  candidates with  no party  politics,  have also been a recognition of Inuit 
traditions with regards to authority (Nunavut Government, 2012). 
It has been  pointed out how  the ICC seek  to complement rather than contest  the state 
in  matters of authority.  One can  argue that this relationship is recognised in  the 
UN-declaration  on  the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  In  the declaration  it is stated 
that;  “In  conjunction  with  indigenous peoples … states shall take effective measures; 
states shall  provide effective mechanisms for  protection of … any  action  which has 
the aim  or  effect  of depriving  [indigenous peoples]  of their  integrity  as distinct 
peoples; states shall establish  and implement, in  conjunction  with  indigenous 
peoples concerned” (UN RIP, 2007). These formulations suggest  a  recognition  of a 
dual or  complementary  structure, as also proposed by  the ICC. We can  thus regard 
the ICC’s perception and articulation  of authority  sharing, as recognised within 
UN-discourse. 
The ICC pursue an  active  role in policy  deliberations in  regional governance, as 
Permanent Participants in  the Arctic Council. They  regard comprehensive policies of 
regional  development as an  essential part  of their  development,  and argue that they 
should not only  participate in  deliberations on  the Arctic  environment, but 
comprehensive deliberations on all aspects of regional governance are imperative.
It is often  recognised that the Permanent  Participants of the Arctic Council  are 
granted full participation  rights within  the council.  Although  not full members, they 
do have a  de facto equal  participation  in  the Arctic Council’s deliberations, alongside 
the member states (Young  & Einarsson  2004: 20). The declarations and policy 
decisions produced by  the Arctic  Council are considerably  influenced by  the 
involvement  of Indigenous Peoples35. The strongest  point  of objection  for  ICC 
concerning the Arctic  Council,  is the deliberate decision  not  to include military  and 
security-related issues within  the mandate of the Arctic Council (AC 1996: 2).  The 
ICC claim  that for  an  active and beneficial partnership between states and 
Indigenous Peoples in  the region,  the full  participation  of these groups in  all matters 
relating  to the Arctic, is imperative.  Following  this, the decision  of the Arctic  states’ 
Rearticulating Sovereignty in the Arctic
54 / 64
35 e.g. the mentioned support for the University of the Arctic
governments to not  include Indigenous Peoples in deliberations on  matters such  as 
sovereignty  issues and -disputes in  the region, is a  clear  sign  of a  misrecognition  of 
the Indigenous groups, exemplified most  vividly  in  the Ilulissat  Declaration from 
2008.
In the Ilulissat  Declaration,  the responsibility  for  the well-being and development  of 
Indigenous Peoples is laid solely  at  the mercy  of the states in  which  they  preside. 
Moreover, the ICC and other  Permanent Participants are not  signatories of any 
official declarations or  policy  decisions officially  made by  the Arctic Council,  and as 
such, they  do not constitute a  de jure equal partner  to the member-states,  and are to 
some extent,  at  least  in  principle,  reliant  on  the willingness of the states in  order  to 
be included in  decision-making  within the Arctic  Council.  It remains that  the ICC, 
because of their  sub- and transnational nature, do not in  itself gain  recognition of 
authority,  without  some sort of interstate agreement between  the respective states in 
the region.
The ICC propose an  increase in  comprehensive regional  cooperation  and integration, 
with  the ICC as active and fully  participating partners. As the commonality  of the 
identity  of the ICC  is regionally  constructed,  a  regional  governance structure based 
on  regional coherence and shared identity  would enable a  more far-reaching 
recognition  of their  identity  and claim  to authority  within  the region.  A  closer 
regional  integration in  terms of governance structures,  would thus enable the ICC  to 
obtain  multilateral and regional recognition  of their  claims to authority,  with  regards 
to their comprehensive policy.
Below  we provide a  model for  simplifying  transnational cooperation, including 
regional  non-state polities in  the Arctic region.  Here,  states and sub-state actors 
interact  and relate to each  other  through  regional governance structures.  The model 
helps illustrate the Arctic  regional  actors’ relations and interplay  in  a  very  simple 
manner. It portrays how  the region is connected through  what we term  ‘a  regional 
identity  filter’.  This filter  determines which  types of decisions are made within the 
regional  governance structure, in  our  case, the Arctic Council.  Within  the regional 
governance structure political decisions are likely  to be more comprehensive and 
consensus oriented thus providing possibilities for  non-state polities of outacting a 
higher  degree of authority.  The density  of the filter  can  be understood by 
investigating  the logics of equivalence between the actors in  the region: the more 
equating  elements, the denser the filter  and followingly, the more decisions are made 
within the regional governance structure. 
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The ‘hierarchy’ of the regional governance structure is measured by  the level  of 
autonomous decision-making  authority.  In  this hierarchy  we find that  the 
state-actors have the highest  level of autonomous decision-making  authority,  under 
which  less autonomous sub-state actors,  such as the Nunavut  territory, are found. 
These sub-state actors are not  part  of the regional governance structure, but  through 
the construction of a  collective transnational identity  and subsequently,  an  Inuit 
polity, they can influence decisions on the regional level.
The model proves useful for  three analytical purposes. First, in  order  to identify  the 
authority  of the sub-state actors, we need to analyse these actors’ collective 
transnational identity  and the mechanisms through  which  this identity  is recognised. 
Second, and in  order  to determine the relation  between  the state and sub-state 
actors,  an  analysis of the level of autonomy  and authority  is necessary. Through an 
analysis of authority-sharing mechanisms, land claim  agreements and other 
devolutions between states and sub-state actors, such  as the self-governing units of 
Nunavut, Greenland and North  Slope Borough, it  becomes possible to determine 
such  a  level  of authority.  Third, the model  exhibits how  the equating bonds between 
the sub-state actors also affect  the equating  bonds between the state actors, 
essentially  forming  a  more cohesive regional identity. If however,  the actors 
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Fig. 1: Analytical model for transnational cooperation, including regional non-state polities.
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differentiate from  each other, an  increase in  agreements outside of the regional 
governance structure will take place. The ICC and the sub-state actors represented by 
them, will thus be outside influence.
We have argued how  the recognition  of indigenous peoples’ rights within  different 
fora  have strengthened the autonomous authority  of the Inuit as a  transnational 
people,  both  in  sub-state matters through land-claims and self-government 
structures, and regionally  through  active  participation  in  regional decision  making. 
The recognition  of an  Inuit  political identity  and polity  is reflected in  their  pursued 
admission into regional  governance structures.  As the ICC states: “The ICC provides 
an  ideal forum  for  Inuit  from  the various Arctic states to engage in  social  and cultural 
relations and work  together  on  a  wide range of economic,  social, cultural and 
environmental questions pertaining to Inuit and the Arctic” (ICC, 1991). 
Recognition  however, can  as we have argued,  be localised both  internally  and 
externally. ICC’s recognition  also depends heavily  on  internal legitimacy  and 
identification. We have chosen  to go about  this with  a  rather  strong  assumption  of 
the ICC as representative, as they  claim  to be so.  In  order  to fully  explore, how  the 
legitimacy  of the ICC affects their  level of participation within  regional  governance 
structures, a  thorough  analysis of the internal  legitimacy  and recognition  would be 
necessary. Although, short  on  material on  the internal  recognition  of the ICC, 
proceedings from  their  general  assemblies,  in  which  political leaders for  the 
self-governing  Inuit  units attend,  aid the perception of a  high degree of internal 
recognition.  Especially  the proceedings from  the 11th  general assembly  in  2010, 
exhibits a  high  degree of participation  of an  extensive variety  of officials, society 
groups and local representatives from across the region.
In  Essex School terms,  the ICC’s articulation  of their  claim  to sovereign  recognition 
and autonomous authority  in  regional cooperation  contests the prevailing  and 
hegemonic discourse within  the state-system. Their  articulation  of a  need for 
authority  sharing  with  the state in  this cooperation, exhibits a  participation and 
hegemonisation  of the present discourse, rather  than an  attempt  of dislocation, 
which  would entail an  encompassing  structural  deficiency  in  the hegemonic 
discourse. A  dislocation  would invoke a  critical ‘identity  crisis’ in  where the inherent 
logic  of meaning  within the discourse would no longer  be contingent, and 
consequently  a  collapse of the structural coherency  within  the system. Rather,  we 
have found that the ICC re-articulate the meaningful elements under the nodal  point 
of sovereignty,  that  enables non-state regional actors to have legitimacy  of authority 
in  regional cooperation,  and does so through  incremental and participatory 
development of the  discourse,  in  their  attempt  of hegemonisation. The recognition  of 
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the ICC’s authority,  in  terms of self-determination  and -government  in  order  to 
sustain their  livelihoods,  and the participation  in  deliberations on  developments that 
affect  their  cultural integrity,  exemplifies this participatory  and incremental  process, 
where the ICC participates in the discourse it re-articulates.
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CONCLUSION
Seeking to answer  ‘how  an  investigation  of the concept of sovereignty, through  the 
Inuit Circumpolar  Council’s claim  to sovereignty, illuminate how  new  forms of 
governance and authority  structures are renegotiated in  international  relations’ we 
started out  by  examining the dominant  theoretical traditions and their 
conceptualisations of sovereignty.
Neither Realism  nor Liberalism  were suitable theoretical  foundations for a  critical 
analysis of a  possible transformation  of the concept  of sovereignty,  as they  depart 
from  a  state-centric epistemology,  resulting  in  an  inseparable conflation of state and 
absolute sovereignty.
Through  a  deconstruction of Jackson, James and Hinsley’s conceptualisations of 
sovereignty  into the constitutive elements of territory,  population, authority  and 
recognition,  we constructed a  framework  for  our  analysis.  Through these elements 
we presented a narrative  of an  Inuit  indigenous collective  identity,  which  has 
developed into and been conceptualised as an Inuit indigenous polity.
We found that  reconsidering  and reconceptualising  sovereignty  entails 
understanding  social  reality,  through  contesting  processes,  change in  practices and 
intersubjective structures and understandings, rather  than  objectively  existing 
structures and closed-off entities.
Adopting a  social  constructivist  epistemology,  we have used the Essex  School 
terminology  as a  framework for  our  investigation. The four elements of territory, 
population,  authority  and recognition  took the form  of methodological guides,  in 
order  for  us to investigate ICC’s rearticulation  of the meaning  of sovereignty. 
Analysing the re-articulation of territory, population  and authority  by  the ICC 
enabled us to elucidate the construction  of a  regional Inuit  identity  antagonistically 
posited to the state.
The ICC have re-articulated territory, as not confined in  demarcated boundaries, but 
instead through cultural integrity  and dependency  on  nature as their  identity  is 
inextricably  linked to it. Population,  is articulated as the Inuit conception  of identity, 
constructed around the idea  of indigeneity,  as described in  UN-discourse, 
antagonistically  opposing the conflation  of state and nation.  Authority  is , by 
constructing an  autonomous polity  acting  through  processes of authority  sharing, 
claiming  self-determination, and thus contest the absolute authority  of the 
nation-state.
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Recognising  our  scientific-philosophical  argument, structures and institutions in 
international society  are created, reified and shaping  of and by  actors, and norms 
and processes constituting  these. In  order  to understand the effect  of ICC’s 
re-articulations, we investigated the relationship between the ICC and the 
international structure or  discourse, by  looking at the external recognition  of these 
articulations.
In  the case of the ICC, a  discourse on  indigeneity, human  rights and environment has 
opened a  source of legitimacy  on  which  to construct  power and identity,  not solely 
dependent  on  territorial integrity.  Rather  this discourse,  constituting  a  part  of 
globalising processes, shifts importance to symbolic meanings of territory  and 
identity,  and re-conceptualises sovereignty  as a recognised aspiration, legitimisation 
and self-determination of a polity.
ICC’s hegemonic project  does not  entail a  discourse that  would invoke a  dislocation 
of sovereignty  in a  revolutionary  sense.  Rather  their  hegemonic project is to 
re-establish  the meaning of sovereignty, through  a  rearticulation  of the structuring 
elements of the nodal point; sovereignty.  The rearticulation  of the three elements we 
have dealt with  in  this paper, and the ICC’s insistence on  the participation  in, rather 
than  secession  from, the state-system  enables them  to construct a  discourse, wherein 
both  autonomous state and non-state  regional actors are cooperating. This 
demonstrate that  the sovereignty  discourse is not  finite,  meaning that  actors,  which 
are not  defined by  the exact  same structural  elements as the state,  can participate 
and that the discourse is both “flexible and capable  of integrating  new  events into 
[its] symbolic order” (Torfing 2005: 16).
We have presented a  narrative of an  Inuit  indigenous identity,  which  has developed 
into and been  conceptualised as,  an  Inuit  polity.  This narrative has offered a 
possibility  of understanding  how  a  transnational people have attempted to engage in 
global discourse,  in a  manner, which  has allowed them  to take upon  authoritative 
structures and define new, arising  issues and challenges,  as well  as letting these 
phenomena  define them. The investigation  of the ICC have thus contributed to a 
strengthening of the argument  that  sovereignty  can  be restructured through 
contestation  of state-bound authority  structures and especially, through the 
construction  of internationally  recognised transnational identities. Concludingly,  we 
find that  a deconstruction  of sovereignty  into the constitutive elements of population, 
territory,  authority  and recognition,  offers a  useful  conceptual framework for 
understanding such transnational polities’ claim to sovereignty.
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